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ARTICLE
An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain
KEITH

N. HYLTON*

ProfessorHylton's paperpresents an economic theory of the duty to bargain in
good faith under the NationalLabor RelationsAct. The duty to bargain alters
bargainingincentives in two ways. First, it imposes a duty to disclose relevant
information on the informationally advantagedparty. Second, by conditioning
the right to act unilaterallyon satisfaction of bargainingobligations,the duty to
bargain brings about a partial reallocation of the parties' entitlements. This
partialreallocation increases the potential gains from honest contracting relative to the benefits of exploiting an informational advantage and thus alters
incentives in a way that makes honest dealing more likely.
I. INTRODUCTION

This article presents an economic theory of the duty to bargain in good
faith, perhaps the thorniest issue in labor law. I endeavor to show that
there is an underlying economic logic that makes sense of the doctrine in
this area.
The field is rich in paradoxes. The paradox that has troubled commentators from the start is the almost oxymoronic quality of the expression "duty
to bargain." Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
states clearly that the parties are obligated to bargain, but not to make
concessions. But how can such an obligation be enforced, other than by
requiring concessions?' If the statute is to have any effect at all, it cannot
be considered satisfaction of the duty to bargain for a party to talk
endlessly in marathon bargaining sessions without ever coming around to a
serious settlement offer. The duty does not apply to every bargaining topic,
* Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. I thank Ian Ayres,
Robert Cooter, John Donohue, Mike Harper (especially), Eric Rasmusen, and Kathy Spier
for helpful comments. I also thank seminar participants at Northwestern University School
of Law, University of Chicago Law School, and the 1994 American Law and Economics
Association Meetings for comments. I have benefited from the financial support of the Fund
for Labor Relations Studies and the Northwestern University Corporate Counsel Center.
1. The Supreme Court recognized this tension early on in its interpretation of the NLRA:
"Obviously there is a tension between the principle that the parties need not contract on any
specific terms and a practical enforcement of the principle that they are bound to deal with
each other in a serious attempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground." NLRB
v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 486 (1959). For an early and influential examination of
this issue, see Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401
(1958) (questioning decisions that look to objective criterion of reasonableness in bargaining
rather than just examining the subjective willingness of the parties to negotiate).

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[
[Vol.
83:19

which immediately calls to mind the amusing image of negotiators arguing,
and perhaps bargaining, over whether they are really under an obligation
to bargain on a particular topic. Finally, and perhaps most worrisome for
those who view the NLRA as a great legislative achievement, the parties
can opt out of the bargaining regime by waiving the right to bargain on a
particular topic.
Does the duty to bargain do anything, that is to say, does it have any
effect at all? This is the central question for the contract theorist, because
one might question the need for such a duty. If there are no impediments
to contracting, which seems to be a reasonable assumption in the employment context, self-interest should lead the parties to exhaust all potential
mutually beneficial transactions. To justify the imposition of a duty to
bargain, one must reject the assumption that nothing stands in the way of
rational, fully informed bargaining. But the parties face each other, so
where is the obstacle to contracting? This article asserts that the impediment is informational asymmetry. The mandatory bargaining obligations
address this market failure by restricting each party's ability, and reducing
the incentive, to exploit informational advantages in bargaining.
More precisely, the duty to bargain alters bargaining incentives in two
ways. First, it imposes a duty to disclose relevant information on the
informationally advantaged party. Contract law theorists have argued for
some time that many contract law doctrines serve the function of enhancing disclosure incentives and mitigating incentives to act opportunistically. 2
Doctrine governing the duty to provide information serves the same purpose. Second, by conditioning the right to act unilaterally on satisfactioh of
bargaining obligations, the duty to bargain brings about something that I
describe in the text as a partial entitlement shift. The partial shift increases
the potential gains to be derived from the contract relative to the benefits
to be derived from exploiting an informational advantage, and thus alters
incentives in a way that makes honest dealing more likely. While the
information disclosure requirement acts as a stick, the partial entitlement
shift acts as a carrot to induce honest contracting.
I focus on three components of the duty to bargain: the distinction
between mandatory and permissive bargaining topics, the specific obligations that attach to bargaining on mandatory topics, and the obligations
that attach to bargaining on permissive topics.
2. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, FillingGaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (advocating the use of "penalty default" rules

that would give parties in contract cases incentives to avoid the use of vague terms and
reliance on default rules); Charles V. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination of the Basis of Contracts, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1265 (1980) (finding "substantial

congruence" between traditional contract law and the optimal level of enforcement of
promises); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L.

REV. 521, 522 (1981) (arguing that implying terms into contracts reduces opportunistic
behavior).
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The first half of this article focuses on the specific requirements of the
duty to bargain, while the second half focuses on its scope, particularly
with respect to mandatory bargaining. Labor law distinguishes mandatory
and permissive topics: the duty to bargain attaches to the former, while the
latter are generally sheltered from the statutory bargaining duties. In
contrast to the traditional view of commentators in this area,3 I argue that
the sheltering function, as it has been developed by courts, is defensible
and desirable. In some instances, for example, it essentially prevents the
employer from introducing a disguised version of the yellow-dog contract
(a contract conditioning employment on a promise by the employee not to
join a union). I also provide a theory of the scope of employer obligations.
Overall, this article takes a contract theory approach to understanding
bargaining obligations. 4 Throughout, I consider the reasons the contractmaking process may fail and how the law might assist the parties. However, I see this as more than an application of contract theory to labor law.
The duty to bargain entails obligations that, in many instances, go beyond
those observed in the law of contracts. The challenge is to provide a theory
of these additional obligations. The doctrines governing the distinction
between mandatory and permissive, the scope of mandatory bargaining,
and the obligations attached to mandatory and permissive topics all have
justifications in the nature of the contract benefits that the parties seek
and the costs they try to avoid.
This article is organized as follows. Part II presents a detailed discussion

3. The distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining topics was criticized very
early by two of the most influential commentators in this area. See HARRY H. WELLINGTON,
LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 63-90 (1968) (stating that the distinction between mandatory and permissive topics intrudes upon freedom of contract without furthering statutory
goals); Archibald Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44

VA. L. REV. 1057, 1079-86 (1958) (arguing that the channeling of contract negotiations
through the creation of mandatory and permissive topics of bargaining is inconsistent with
the national policy of not setting terms of employment by government mandate). The
criticisms of Cox and Wellington have only recently been challenged by efforts to provide

theoretical justifications for the decisions concerning bargaining over plant closings and
relocations. See Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National
Maintenance: The Scope of MandatoryBargaining,68 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1463 (1982) (catego-

rizing product market decisions-a term Harper defines as "all decisions to determine what
products are created and sold, in what quantities, for which markets, and at what prices"-as
permissive issues, in contrast to other major economic decisions, which are mandatory topics
of bargaining); Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of
Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting,
PartialClosure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1988) (arguing that the laws

governing the relationship between employers and current workers usually produce efficient
results).
4. Although I make heavy use of the economic theory of contracts, the general notion that
a contract perspective may be useful in understanding collective bargaining law has been
suggested before. See, e.g., David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663 (1973); Clyde W. Summers, Collective Agreements and the
Law of Contracts,78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969).
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of the duty to bargain. Such a discussion is warranted because the doctrine
is complex and the rules are hard to grasp without the aid of examples.
Part III presents the theory of bargaining obligations. Subpart III.A. presents
an economic justification of the mandatory bargaining requirements. Subpart III.B. presents an economic theory of the scope of the duty to bargain.
Part IV concludes.
II. THE LAW OF BARGAINING AND LABOR CONTRACTS
The law of labor contracts is made up of two parts: the law of obligations
and the law of enforcement. The law of obligations defines rules that
parties are expected to comply with in negotiating, executing, and enforcing their agreements. The law of enforcement is made up of largely
procedural rules specifying who can bring suit and when. For the most
part, this section will focus on the law of obligations, with brief notes at the
end on the law of enforcement. 5
A. OBLIGATIONS

The relevant provisions of the NLRA are Sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), 8(d),
and 301. Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for the employer
to refuse to bargain in good faith;6 8(b)(3) does the same for the union.7
Section 8(d) defines the duty to bargain in good faith8 and establishes the
general category of "mandatory subjects" for which the bargaining duty
applies. Section 301 creates a federal cause of action for breaches of
collective bargaining agreements.9
The provisions of a collective bargaining agreement can be sorted into
one or more of the following three categories: mandatory, permissive, and
contractual.1 i The mandatory category includes all provisions that are
5. I apologize in advance for the length of this section. I believe, however, that an
extended discussion is warranted given the complexity of the basic doctrine in this area. I
found it necessary to include several examples to clarify the rules. The reader who is familiar
with labor bargaining law may skim over the examples without losing much.
6. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988), states that "[i]t shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer.. . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." The duty to bargain in good faith was first announced by the
National Labor Board, the predecessor to the National Labor Relations Board, in Houde
Engineering Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. (old) 35 (1934).
7. Section 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1988), states that "[ilt shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents ... to refuse to bargain collectively with an
employer."
8. Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988) defines the duty to bargain as "the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment.., but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession."
9. Section 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
10. The categories are not mutually exclusive. A subject can be both mandatory and
contractual. For example, wages are a mandatory subject whether they are specified in the
collective bargaining agreement or not.
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mandatory subjects of bargaining. Sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), and 8(d) of the
NLRA impose on the parties a duty to bargain in good faith with respect
to mandatory subjects. Section 8(d) defines mandatory issues as those
involving wages, hours, and "terms and conditions" of employment."
Topics that are not mandatory are referred to as permissive.1 2 Section
8(d), which imposes the duty to bargain in good faith, does not apply to
permissive topics.13 Finally, contractual subjects are those upon which the
union and management have reached agreement and that are, therefore,
in the contract. Because they may be either mandatory or permissive, the
contractual category overlaps with the mandatory and permissive categories. However, the mandatory and permissive categories are mutually
exclusive. Figure 1 presents the scheme:

Mandatory

Permissive

Contract

§ 8 (a)(5)
§ 8 (b) (3)

/

/

§ 301

§ 8 (a) (5)

§ 8 (d)
§ 8 (b) (3)
§ = Section
FIGURE 1

With respect to mandatory subjects, the basic requirements are generally: (1) a duty to bargain in good faith, and (2) a duty not to act
unilaterally. As the label suggests, the duty to bargain in good faith really
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
12. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). For an explanation of the origin of the terms "mandatory" and "permissive" as used in the NLRA, see
ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 496-98 (1976). The distinction between mandatory and permissive issues has been a fixed
part of the legal landscape since the Supreme Court's decision in Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at
349.
13. Borg-Warner,356 U.S. at 349.
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incorporates two requirements: a duty to deal and a duty to negotiate in
good faith. The duty to deal is an obligation to bargain, but it does not

impose further requirements regarding the effort or attention given to the
process. The good faith requirement imposes the additional burden of
bargaining in a manner that suggests a desire to reach an agreement.1 4 The
addition of the second requirement may be insignificant, however, because
one can agree to meet and discuss matters, so as to create the impression
that an agreement is desired, while at the same time adopting tactics at the
negotiating table that are certain to eliminate the possibility that an
agreement will be reached. To do so might strike any ordinary person as a
refusal to bargain, but it is difficult for the law to identify such conduct. 5
In any event, I will not discuss the good faith requirements in detail here. 6
14. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
595 (1941) (holding that following beginning of strike, respondent legally bound to confer
and negotiate sincerely with employee representatives); Nathan P. Feinsinger, The National
Labor Relations Act and Collective Bargaining, 57 MICH. L. REV. 807, 812 (1959) (proposing
"sincere desire ... to reach an agreement" as a simple standard for determining when
8(a)(5) violations have occurred).
15. For example, suppose the employer offers a newly elected union a contract in which
each worker's wages are one-half of current levels, and then says, "Take it or leave it." I
return to this problem later in the text.
16. In order to make this clear, I sometimes will use the narrower expression "duty to
deal." I am using this term only to signal to the reader that I devote little space in this paper
to subjective good faith cases in which the Board examines bargaining tactics and proposals
in order to determine whether the employer or the union violated the duty to bargain in
good faith. See, e.g., Radisson Plaza Minneapolis v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1376, 1381 (8th Cir.
1993) (finding employer did not bargain in good faith when employer refused union requests
for information relevant to union's duties as collective bargaining representative, unilaterally
altered wages and benefit schedules, cancelled meetings with union, ended meetings early,
wasted bargaining session time on irrelevant matters, questioned the legitimacy of the union,
and proposed patently unacceptable terms of employment); NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 732 F.2d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding lack of good faith when the
employer's proposals were "unusually harsh and unreasonable"); NLRB v. Billion Motors,
Inc., 700 F.2d 454, 456 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding bad faith bargaining when company's
negotiator was unprepared, failed to attend bargaining session, announced impasse prematurely, offered sham wage proposals, and company was hostile to union before negotiations);
NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 756 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding bad faith when
employer took a "take it or leave it" approach to bargaining, emphasized the weakness of
the union, and portrayed itself as the defender of employee rights); Borg-Warner Controls,
198 N.L.R.B. 726, 727 (1972) (finding violation of good faith because of employer's inflexible
attitude). Some of the cases generate or are based on per se rules, while others seem to rely
on a "totality of the circumstances" reasoning. See PHILIP Ross, THE GOVERNMENT AS A
SOURCE OF UNION POWER: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

103-88, 149-63 (1965) (tracing the development of the good faith requirement in case law
and statutes and commenting on its impact).
As many of commentators in this area have noted, the good faith cases can be divided into
"per se" and "subjective good faith" cases. See, e.g., Robert P. Duvin, The Duty to Bargain:
Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 266-77 (1964). The per se cases announce
certain procedures that must be followed. For example, refusing to meet at reasonable times
or at a reasonable place is a per se violation. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962)
(declaring that unilateral modification by an employer of a condition of employment that is a
mandatory subject of bargaining constitutes violation of duty to bargain in good faith);
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Although there are many such requirements, the most important, and the
one that I discuss in more detail later, is the duty to disclose relevant
information.1 7
1. The Duty to Deal
Under the duty to deal, neither party can refuse to negotiate when the
other signals a desire to bargain about some mandatory topic unless the
18
topic is explicitly covered in the collective bargaining agreement. Imagine, for example, that the collective bargaining agreement says nothing
about wages. If the union requests bargaining on wages during the term of
the contract, the employer violates Section 8(a)(5) if she refuses to bargain. Outside of the term of the contract, the analysis is simpler: the duty
to bargain is a general one that applies to both parties when the subject is
mandatory.
Now suppose, as is typically the case, the contract covers wages and sets
them at some level, say fifteen dollars per hour. If the union requests
bargaining during the term of the contract, the employer may refuse to
19
bargain even though wages are a mandatory subject. This is because the
duty to bargain applies only to those mandatory subjects that are not
explicitly covered by the contract. Another way in which a mandatory
subject can be exempted from the bargaining obligation is by the inclusion
of a "zipper" clause in the contract. Such a clause relieves the parties of
the duty to bargain (during the term of the contract) with respect to

NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) (holding that a refusal to open the books

to substantiate a claim of inability to pay is, absent unusual conditions, a per se violation of
the duty to bargain); NLRB v. Mayes Bros., Inc., 383 F.2d 242, 285 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding

that a per se violation occurs when the employer misleads the union into thinking that an

agreement had already been reached); Lock Nut Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 600, 608 (1948) (finding

two meetings per month unreasonable). In the subjective good faith cases the Board infers a
violation of 8(a)(5) from a pattern of tactics and proposals. Duvin, supra, at 257-65; see also
James A. Gross et al., Good Faith in Labor Negotiations: Tests and Remedies, 53

CORNELL

L.

1009, 1017-34 (1968) (analyzing subjective good faith cases and proposing alternative
approach).
REV.

The subjective good faith cases are the most controversial, and discussion of these cases

dominates the literature in this area. The reason for the controversy is simple: If the Board
examines tactics at the bargaining table too closely, then it will eventually find itself forcing

an employer to make concessions to a union that is too weak to gain the concessions on its

own. For a relatively early discussion of the controversy, see Russell A. Smith, The Evolution
of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MicH. L. REV. 1065, 1098 (1941)

(noting the distinction between the Board forcing employers to fulfill procedural requirements of bargaining and forcing employers to offer reasonable terms).

17. Truitt, 351 U.S. at 151.
18. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B.
1214, 1217 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).

19. United Mine Workers v. NLRB, 879 F.2d 939, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Jacobs, 94
N.L.R.B. at 1219.
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matters not covered by the contract."
With respect to permissive subjects there is no such duty to deal. Thus,
if the union requests bargaining over a permissive subject not covered by
the contract, the employer may refuse to bargain without violating the
Act.2 1 In addition, if the union insists on bargaining to impasse about a
permissive subject, or conditions bargaining over a mandatory subject on
the employer's willingness to bargain over a permissive one, then the union
may violate its duty to bargain in good faith.22 It follows that the duty to
deal is more than just a duty to bargain with respect to mandatory topics.
It includes a duty to deal in a certain way on permissive topics.
Unlike mandatory subjects, which place a symmetric bargaining duty on
both parties to the contract, permissive subjects are default rules that favor
one of the parties. It is useful to think of the permissive subjects as either
permissive in favor of management or permissive in favor of the union. If the
subject is permissive in favor of management, then the union violates its
duty to bargain in good faith by insisting on bargaining to impasse. Similarly, if the subject is permissive in favor of the union, then the employer
violates Section 8(a)(5) by bargaining to impasse on the issue. One general
category of subjects permissive in favor of the union involves the union's
internal governance structure.23 The governance of the strike decision, for
example, is a permissive subject. If the employer demands as a condition of
settlement of a contract that the union submit strike decisions to a vote by
the membership, then the employer violates the duty to bargain in good
faith. Similar restrictions apply to the union with respect to subjects
permissive in favor of the employer; for example, if the union demands
that the employer submit lockout decisions to ratification by shareholders,

20. The Board provided early approval of such clauses in its Jacobs opinion:
And if the parties originally desire to avoid later discussion with respect to matters
not specifically covered in the terms of an executed contract, they need only so
specify in the terms of the contract itself. Nothing in our construction of Section
8(d) precludes such an agreement, entered into in good faith, from foreclosing
future discussion of matters not contained in the agreement.
Jacobs, 94 N.L.R.B. at 1220. For further discussion, see Harry T. Edwards, Deferral to

Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at

the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23, 27-35 (1985) (advocating Board deferral to arbitration when
the parties have signed a contract waiving Board jurisdiction in favor of arbitration).
21. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); Inland Tugs v.
NLRB, 918 F.2d 1299, 1308 (7th Cir. 1990); Louisian Dock Co. v. NLRB, 909 F.2d 281, 286
(7th Cir. 1990); General Drivers and Helpers Union v. Young & Hay Transp. Co., 522 F.2d
562, 566 (8th Cir. 1975).
22. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349.

23. Id. at 350 (discussing employer's proposal to require vote by employees on strike
decisions; the court considered this permissive because it "deals only with relations between
the employees and the unions" as opposed to "relations between the employer and the
employees").
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24
then it violates its duty to bargain in good faith.

2. The Duty Not to Make Changes Unilaterally
The second general duty encompassed by Section 8(a)(5) is a prohibition, though somewhat unevenly applied, on unilateral action that alters
the status quo with regard to a mandatory subject. For simplicity, I will
start with the duty of the employer. The employer generally may not act
unilaterally regarding a mandatory subject without first bargaining to
impasse.2 5 Thus, if the employer announces that she will reduce wages
from fifteen dollars to fourteen dollars without first bargaining to impasse,
she violates the duty to bargain in good faith. Interestingly, the legal
posture of the violation depends on whether the contract covers the
subject.
Contractualoverlap and the employer's obligations. Suppose wages are not
covered by the contract. If the employer unilaterally reduces wages (without bargaining to impasse), she violates the duty to bargain in good faith.
If we instead suppose that wages are covered by the contract, then the
employer violates the same duty (and therefore Section 8(a)(5)), but does
so by violating a more specific provision of the Act-Section 8(d)-which
requires the parties to maintain the provisions of the contract until expiration.2 6 Thus, if the mandatory term is not included in the contract, the
employer violates 8(a)(5) directly. If the mandatory term is included in the
contract, the employer violates 8(a)(5) indirectly by violating 8(d).
24. See, e.g., Houchens Market v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 208, 212 (6th Cir. 1967) (noting that
extent of authority delegated to the bargaining agent is not an issue on which the employer
can insist "any more than the Union can insist that the contract be submitted to the Board of
Directors or stockholders of the Company").
25. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742 (1962). Impasse is defined as "that point at which the
parties have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement and further discussions
would be fruitless .... The Board and courts look to such matters as the number of meetings
between the company and union, the length of those meetings, and the period of time that
has transpired between the start of negotiations and their breaking off." GORMAN, supra
note 12, at 448. Generally the Board looks at "the bargaining history, the good faith of the
parties in negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the importance of the issue, . . . [and]
the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations." Taft
Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967).
26. See H&H Forms, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. No.123 (1992) (declaring that employer's failure
to pay employees for all hours worked and cessation of contractually required contributions
to employee welfare benefits fund, without affording union opportunity to bargain over such
actions, constitute an unfair labor practice violative of 8(d) and 8(a)(5)); Wightman Center
for Nursing and Rehabilitation, 301 N.L.R.B. 573, 576 (1991) (holding that employer's
unilateral midterm increase in wages violates sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5)); Milwaukee Spring
Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1984) [hereinafter Milwaukee Spring II]
(finding employer's relocation not contrary to terms of existing contract, therefore relocation
did not violate Sections 8(a)(5) or 8(d)); Oak Cliff Golman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1063,
enforced, 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975) (holding employer's
unilateral midterm decision to reduce wages violates sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5)).
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Unilateral action with regard to permissive subjects is more complicated. First, suppose that the permissive subject is not contained in the
contract. Then, if the subject is permissive in favor of management, the
employer may act unilaterally at any time.27 Consider, for example, a
change in the governance structure of the corporation, which is permissive
in favor of management. The employer is free to make modifications
without bargaining with the union. If the topic is permissive in favor of the
union, such as the governance of the strike decision, the employer violates
the duty to bargain by unilaterally altering the arrangement.2 8 Of course,
this may seem farfetched because the employer usually will not be able to
unilaterally modify the governance structure of the union. However, there
are more realistic examples.
Whether the union must post a bond in order to guarantee its promise
not to strike has been deemed a subject permissive in favor of the union.2 9
The employer could collect such a bond on her own by simply extracting a
fee from all of the workers and setting the money aside in a fund that
would be forfeited by the workers in the event of a strike. If no strike
occurred, the money could be returned to the workers with interest at the
end of every year or quarter. Obviously, the employer has the power to set
up such a fund unilaterally. To do so, however, would violate Section
8(a)(5).
It follows from these examples that the textbook description of the duty
not to act unilaterally is inadequate. There is no general category of
permissive subjects with respect to which the parties are free to act
unilaterally. There are subjects permissive in favor of management and
those permissive in favor of the union. The employer is free to act unilaterally as long as the subject is permissive in favor of management. If it is
permissive in favor of the union, the employer will generally not be able to
act unilaterally. But where the employer has the power to act unilaterally,
she is forbidden to do so.
The employer's freedom to act unilaterally changes when the permissive
issue is covered by the contract. Somewhat surprisingly, 8(d) does not
27. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 185-86

(1971); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); see also
GORMAN, supra note 12, at 443.
28. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349-50.

29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wright Motors, 603 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Local
264, Laborers' Int'l Union, 529 F.2d 778, 786 (8th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. International Hod

Carriers, Local No. 1082, 384 F.2d 55, 56-57 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968);
Local 164, Bhd. of Painters v. NLRB, 293 F.2d 133, 135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824
(1961); Covington Furniture Mfg., 212 N.L.R.B. 214, 216-19 (1974), enforced, 514 F.2d 995,

995 (6th Cir. 1975).
Financial security pledges happen to make up a general category of subjects that are
permissive in favor of both the union and the employer. In other words, the union violates
Section 8(b)(3) by insisting that the employer post a bond guaranteeing its promises. See
Hod Carriers,384 F.2d at 57.
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govern in such a case, and the employer may act unilaterally without
violating 8(a)(5) if the subject is permissive in favor of management,
although the resulting breach of contract will give the union a claim under
Section 301 of the Act.3 ° If the subject is permissive in favor of the union,
then, assuming the employer has the power to act unilaterally, the employer breaches the contract by acting unilaterally, thereby enabling the
union to bring a claim under Section 301. Interestingly, the employer also
independently breaches the Section 8(a)(5) statutory duty not to unilaterally tamper with subjects permissive in favor of the union.
Consider, for example, a contractual promise by the employer to refrain
from closing one of many plants it operates. The subject is permissive in
favor of management.3 1 If the employer breaches the promise by closing
the plant, the union cannot bring a charge under Section 8(a)(5) even
though the language of 8(d) seems to apply. The courts have interpreted
32
8(d) as applying only to mandatory subjects. The union's remedy is a
Section 301 (breach of contract) action. Contrast the previous example
with a contractual promise by the union to set aside money to be provided
to the employer if the union breaches its promise not to strike. Recall that
33
such an issue is permissive in favor of the union. If the employer deducts
money from wages and uses the proceeds to set up a fund to cover
employer-perceived inadequacies in the union's own liquidated damages
fund, then the employer may have violated the contract and more certainly
will have violated her statutory duty under Section 8(a)(5).
Contractualoverlap and the union's obligations. As a matter of legal principle, the duty not to act unilaterally applies to the union as well. Suppose
the subject is mandatory and not contained in the contract. The general
rule is that unilateral modifications violate the duty to bargain. But the
general rule is not applied in an entirely straightforward way when the
union's duty is at issue. The first question that arises is how can the union
unilaterally modify a mandatory term. For simplicity, let us start with the
case in which the mandatory terms are contained in the contract.
The union can violate the duty not to act unilaterally by breaching either
the explicit or the implicit terms of the contract. While it is clear that the
34
union is unable to modify the wage provision of the contract, there are
other provisions of the agreement that the union is able to unilaterally
alter. For example, the union can unilaterally violate a provision fixing
hours of work. If the union requires members to work fewer hours than

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
wage,

PittsburghPlate Glass, 404 U.S. at 187-88.
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 685 (1981).
PittsburghPlate Glass, 404 U.S. at 185.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
The workers could modify the wage provision if they could pay themselves a higher
but that is an unlikely event.
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stipulated in the contract, it violates its duty to bargain under Section
8(b)(3).35 Provisions allocating rights according to seniority may also be
violated by the unilateral action of the union. 36 Implicit in any employment
agreement is the employer's conditional promise that the relationship will
continue as long as the work is satisfactory. 37 Thus, the employee's promise to provide satisfactory work in exchange for the wage and other
benefits of employment is an implicit term in the contract. 38 The employees have the ability to unilaterally modify this implicit term of the agreement by working at half-pace or, more dramatically, by instituting a full
work stoppage.
But, if employees merely work at half-pace, it is not clear that they
violate the duty to bargain in good faith. For example, if the employees
adopt a work slow-down in order to put pressure on the employer during
contract negotiations and the slow-down occurs after the expiration of the
previous contract, then they do not violate the duty to bargain in good
faith.3 9 Under these conditions, the employer cannot bring a Section
8(b)(3) charge, even though the union's breach is the contractual mirrorimage of the employer's unilateral reduction of the wage. It follows that if
there is no contract and the union directs the employees to adopt a work
slow-down in order to pressure the employer to bargain with the union,
then the union does not violate its duty to bargain in good faith, even
though it has unilaterally modified a mandatory subject of bargaining. If,
however, during the term of a contract, the union employs a work stoppage
or slow-down in order to pressure the employer to change the contract,
then it violates its duty to bargain in good faith.4"
35. New York Dist. Council No. 9, Int'l Bhd. of Painters v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 783, 787 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972). The union would also violate Section 8(d) by

requiring members to work less than the contractually specified number of hours.

36. Stage Employees Local 702 (Deluxe General, Inc.), 197 N.L.R.B. 937, 941 (1972).

37. An at-will contract is the clearest case in which the employer promises to continue the

relationship only as long as the employee's work is satisfactory. The NLRA does not disturb
this basic default rule:

Section 10(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act expressly provides that: "No order of the
Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has
been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was suspended or discharged for cause." There is no more elemental
cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his employer. It is equally
elemental that the Taft-Hartley Act seeks to strengthen, rather than to weaken,
that cooperation, continuity of service and cordial contractual relation between
employer and employee that is born of loyalty to their common enterprise.
NLRB v. Local 1229, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 364 U.S. 464, 472 (1953).

38. Of course, sometimes the contract will specify the pace of work, but for purposes of
this discussion I am assuming that it does not.
39. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 493 (1960).
40. See Brewery Delivery Employees Local 46 (Guinness-Harp Corp.), 236 N.L.R.B. 1160,

1160 (1978) (in contrast to facts of InsuranceAgents, 361 U.S. at 493, the union's use of a
strike and work stoppages aimed at the midterm adoption of a local wage agreement and
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For the case in which the union adopts a slow-down and there is no
contract, the employer's typical remedy is self-help: fire the employees.4"
Although shirking on the job is a partial strike activity in many cases, it is
not protected by the NLRA.4 2 An alternative remedy available to the
employer in this instance is a Section 301 action.
Suppose a mandatory term is not contained in the contract and the
union unilaterally modifies it. If the union has previously agreed to or
acquiesced in the employer's policy regarding the subject, then a unilateral
modification by the employees violates Section 8(b)(3). 4 3 If the union has
never agreed to the policy, then the union presumably does not violate
Section 8(b)(3) because the "existing terms" are not clear.
Finally, consider the regulation of unilateral modifications of permissive
subjects by the union. If the subject is permissive in favor of the union, it
can make modifications regarding that subject at any time. If a subject is
permissive in favor of management, it is unlikely that the union will be able
to make modifications, given the nature of such subjects. For example, the
union generally cannot effect a partial plant closing. If the subject is
covered by the contract, then the union will breach the contract, but it will
not violate Section 8(b)(3) if it effects a unilateral modification.
B. ENFORCEMENT

Implied in any contract are the enforcement procedures governing violations of its terms. Here, the interesting problems arise under Sections
8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3). I will restrict myself to a discussion of 8(a)(5). The
National Labor Relations Board has interpreted the NLRA as denying it
the authority to provide "make whole" or expectation damage remedies in

inclusion of casual employees within the union contract provisions violated 8(d) and 8(b)(3));
United Marine Div. Local 333, 226 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1976) (finding violations of Sections

8(b)(3) and 8(d) when, during the midterm of contract, union threatened work stoppages
unless barges were manned by two barge employees while being towed).
41. Shirking at work and disloyalty generally are not protected by Section 7 of the NLRA.
See NLRB v. Local 1229, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 364 U.S. 464, 476 (1953)

(finding that distributing material attacking the quality of employer's product not protected);
George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that
advocating boycott of employer's product not protected); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333,
336-39 (1950) (shirking at work not protected). But cf. Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889
F.2d 210, 220 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that employee appeals to customers protected when,
though disparaging to employer's product, they were connected to labor dispute, disclosed

no significant confidences, and were made in a reasoned manner).
42. Elk Lumber, 91 N.L.R.B. at 336-37. The employer is free to discharge employees who

shirk on the job even though they do so in a concerted manner. Id. at 338. It is important to
distinguish shirking from other types of partial strike. Suppose several employees, unable to
continue working in the freezing rain, enter the plant and announce that they are going
home. Their actions may be protected by Section 7. See Daniel Constr. Co., 277 N.L.R.B.
795, 795 (1985) (protecting the concerted activity of four employees who left work for one
day rather than work in freezing rain).
43. NLRB v. Communications Workers, Local 1170, 474 F.2d 778, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1972).
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some Section 8(a)(5) cases.' The reason is that the Act has been understood as prohibiting the Board from setting the terms of the contract.
Nevertheless, there are Section 8(a)(5) cases in which the Board provided
something like a make whole remedy.4 5 The distinction seems to be as
follows. If the Section 8(a)(5) charge refers to an employer's refusal to

bargain over mandatory terms not contained in the contract, then the
Board will generally refuse to provide a make whole remedy.4 6 However, if

the Section 8(a)(5) charge refers to an employer's unilateral change in
mandatory terms contained in the contract, then the Board will provide
such a remedy.4 7
Suppose, for example, the contract says nothing about wages and the
employer refuses to bargain in response to a union request for a wage
increase from fifteen to sixteen dollars an hour. The employees would like
to be compensated for the loss of the opportunity to bargain for an
additional one dollar per hour of work that results from the employer's
illegal refusal to bargain. To provide such a damages remedy would
effectively inject new terms into the employer's agreement, and the Board
will refuse to do this.
Continuing with the example, suppose that the employer unilaterally
reduces the wage from fifteen to fourteen dollars without bargaining with
or even consulting the union. The Board will treat this reduction as an
alteration of existing terms under Section 8(d) and provide the appropriate backpay award.
44. The Board lacks the power to compel either side to agree to a substantive contractual
provision of a collective bargaining agreement. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102
(1969). The Board has reasoned from this restriction that in some situations it is not
empowered to provide "make whole" damages under Section 8(a)(5). See St. Francis
Hospital of Lynwood, 232 N.L.R.B. 32, 33 (1977) (refusing to give damages to the unions
based upon what employers would have received had the employer bargained in good faith,
because that would allow the Board to determine the terms to which the employer should
have agreed); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 109-10 (1970) (same).
45. The celebrated Fibreboard decision is an example. The Board's back pay order
amounted to $334,000. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. 142, 152 (1969),
enforced, 436 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

46.

JULIus

G.

GETMAN

&

BERTRAND

B.

POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC

PRO-

CESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE 148 (1988).
47. See Coastal Derby Ref. Co., 312 N.L.R.B. 495, 498 (1993) (requiring employer to
compensate employees for any losses or direct expenses caused by its unilateral change in
health benefits); Owens-Brockway Plastic Products, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 519, 535-36 (ordering
employer who unilaterally decided to relocate to pay employees for the time between
termination and reinstatement); John W. Bolton & Sons, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 989, 990-91
(1950) (ordering employer to restore wage incentive plan after unilaterally modifying it
midterm). The Board will also provide a make whole remedy against a union that strikes
midterm for the modification of a mandatory subject. Teamsters Local No. 70 (Emory
Worldwide), 295 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1124 (1989) (ordering union to compensate the employer
for the increased wages over the affected period when union coerced employer to adopt a
local wage agreement in place of a national one in midterm); Plumbers Local No. 420
(Paragon Mechanical, Inc.), 254 N.L.R.B. 445, 445 (1981) (ordering union to compensate the
employer after it successfully struck midterm for the adoption of a local wage agreement).
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An interesting issue arises when the employer and the union are in the
process of bargaining, and the employer unilaterally reduces the wage.
Any remedy would apparently violate the policy of nonintervention, because the end of the bargaining process probably would have yielded a new
wage level that differed from the pre-existing term. However, the Board
will award a make
treats these cases as unilateral modification cases and
48
policy.
nonintervention
the
of
spite
in
whole remedy
When the employer violates 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain (i.e., without
acting unilaterally), the Board orders the employer to cease and desist
from refusing to bargain, to bargain upon request with the union, and to
49
post a notice advising employees of the substance of the Board's order.
The extent to which this penalty actually hurts the employer depends on
the employer's concern for her reputation as a fair dealer. The cost
incurred by the employer in presenting its case in the Board's administrative process constitutes an additional sanction.
Recall that when an employer violates the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the employees may bring a Section 301 action. The policy
of nonintervention, which prevents the Board from providing make whole
remedies in some Section 8(a)(5) cases, does not apply in this area.
Section 8(d) of the Act, which has been construed as preventing the Board
from setting the terms of a contract, governs duty to bargain violations
only. Thus, it is possible that a federal court would go much further than
the Board in designing5 a remedy which, in effect, injects new terms into
the parties' agreement. 1
BARGAINING OBLIGATIONS: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
REQUIREMENTS AND THE SCOPE OF MANDATORY BARGAINING

III.

This Part presents an economic analysis of the duty to bargain in good
faith. I apply economic analysis to two important aspects of the duty to
48. See Fibreboard, 180 N.L.R.B. at 142 (awarding employees backpay when employer
contracted out bargaining unit work during contract negotiations). See generally GORMAN,
supra note 12, at 536-39 (discussing the ability of the Board to order relief when the
employer frequently violates its duty to bargain and discussing the reluctance of the Board to
use this power).
49. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Controls, 198 N.L.R.B. 726, 739 (1972).
50. For example, in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), which
involved a Section 301 action, the Supreme Court said:
While the principles of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a
contract an unconsenting successor to a contracting party, a collective bargaining
Central to the peculiar status and
agreement is not an ordinary contract ....
function of a collective bargaining agreement is the fact, dictated both by circumstance ... and by the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act, that it is
not in any real sense the simple product of a consensual relationship. Therefore,
although the duty to arbitrate, as we have said, must be founded on a contract, the
impressive policy considerations favoring arbitration are not wholly overborne by
the fact that Wiley did not sign the contract being construed.
Id. at 550 (internal citation omitted).
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bargain: (1) the specific obligations that attach to bargaining on mandatory
subjects and (2) the distinction between mandatory and permissive topics
and the specific obligations associated with bargaining on permissive subjects.
A. MANDATORY SUBJECTS AND THE DUTY TO BARGAIN DURING THE
TERM OF A CONTRACT

In Jacobs Manufacturing Co.5 the Board set forth the legal framework
governing the duty to bargain over mandatory terms during the term of a
contract. The Board had three options available to it. Option I was to hold,
as the law of Section 8(a)(5) now requires, that all mandatory subjects not
contained in the contract carried with them an obligation to bargain, even
during the term of the contract. Option II was to relieve the parties of any
obligation to bargain midterm over subjects not contained within the
contract.5 2 Option III was to require the Board to determine whether the
subject had been discussed during contract negotiations and to hold that as
to the subjects discussed there is no duty to bargain, while as to those not
discussed there is a duty to bargain.5 3
A Board plurality had little trouble discarding Option III due to anticipated administration difficulties associated with its implementation.5 4 First,
Option III would have required the Board to keep track of three categories of subject matter: subjects explicitly covered in the contract; subjects
not covered explicitly in the contract, but closed to renegotiation because
of earlier negotiations; and subjects not covered explicitly in the contract
and open for further negotiation during the term of the contract. Second,
several of the Board members thought that it would be difficult for the
Board, if it adopted Option III, to distinguish between subjects that were
51. 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951).
52. Member Reynolds took this position. Jacobs, 94 N.L.R.B. at 1228-34.
53. This was the position of Chairman Herzog. Jacobs, 94 N.L.R.B. at 1227-28.
54. It may help to provide a simple summary of the rather complicated set of views
expressed in Jacobs. The five Board members were as follows: Chairman Herzog; Members
Houston, Styles, Murdock, and Reynolds. A Board majority consisting of Houston, Styles,
and Herzog held that the employer has a duty to bargain over the subject of pensions if the
subject was not specifically dealt with in the contract and was not discussed in negotiations
leading to the contract. Id. at 1216. The dissent by Members Murdock and Reynolds argued
that Option II was the better approach. Id. at 1231, 1234. Discussing the subject of group
insurance, Members Houston and Styles-the plurality referred to above-expressed the
view that Option III was difficult to administer. Id. at 1221. The dissent by Members
Reynolds and Murdock expressed no view on Option III. Id. at 1228-35.
In its enforcement decision, the appeals court found it unnecessary to determine whether
"discussion" of a subject during negotiations that fails to become a provision in the contract
relieves the employer of an obligation to bargain midterm. See NLRB v. Jacobs, 196 F.2d
680, 683 n.1 (2d Cir. 1952). Subsequent Board and court decisions make clear that only a
discussion constituting a waiver will relieve the employer of a midterm duty to bargain. See,
e.g., Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1346, 1347 (1982); Angelus Block Co., Inc., 250
N.L.R.B. 868, 877 (1980); NL Indus., 220 N.L.R.B. 41, 43 (1975), enforced, 536 F.2d 786
(8th Cir. 1976).
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discussed during contract negotiations and those that were not. As a
consequence, when a subject was not settled in the contract, it would be
extremely difficult for the Board to distinguish between subjects closed to
renegotiation and subjects open to further negotiation.5 5
At first, one might think that Option III is no different from traditional

contract interpretation, in which it is necessary to determine whether there

was an offer and an acceptance.5 6 But the rule proposed might have gone
so far as to relieve the parties of the duty to bargain with respect to any
subject discussed, whether or not it met the traditional "offer-acceptance"
standard.5 7 In traditional contract interpretation, the court is presented
with a contract provision and asked to find the interpretation that reaches
the result both parties would have intended.5 8 In the duty to bargain
55. The Board's opinion noted that
[alpart from the extremely difficult problems of proof ... which would constantly
confront the Board in cases of this type, the parties to collective bargaining
negotiations would always be faced with this question after a subject had been
discussed-"Have we really negotiated, or are we under an obligation to discuss the
subject further if asked to?"
Jacobs, 94 N.L.R.B. at 1221.
56. Under traditional contract theory of offer and acceptance, an offer "is an expression
by one party of his assent to certain definite terms, provided that the other party ... will
likewise express his assent to the identically same terms." 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 11, at 23 (1963) [hereinafter CORBIN ON CONTRACTS]. Often a contract will be

made after preliminary negotiations, which are essentially offers and counter-offers. The
offers and counter-offers do not become a binding contract until they are accepted on
identical terms by the other party. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra, § 22, at 62-67. If the
resulting contract is intended by the parties to be exclusive and final, then it is considered
wholly integrated and cannot be modified by prior communications and agreements between
the parties. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra, § 573, at 357. If the contract is not intended to
be final and complete, then it is considered a partially integrated contract and may be
modified by other agreements, including oral ones. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra, § 581, at
440-41; see also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430, at 97-99 (1981) (explaining that modification
may occur only on a term not covered in the written contract, and the extent of coverage by
the contract is determined by the words of the contract and the intent of the parties).
Consider, then, the contract law treatment of a claim like that in Jacobs. Ordinarily a
complete and final contract fixes the liabilities between the parties, so the employer would
not be obligated to modify the existing contract by adding a new provision that provides for
group insurance. If the contract were not complete and final, then extrinsic (parol) evidence
could be taken into account, and presumably evidence that the employer had rejected an
insurance proposal might resolve the dispute.
57. This concern is raised in the opinion by Members Houston and Styles. Jacobs, 94
N.L.R.B. at 1221. Chairman Herzog's opinion does little to lay these fears to rest. For
example, the Herzog opinion notes that the subject of group insurance, which he considered
closed to further negotiation, had been "fully discussed" and "consciously explored." Id. at
1227 (Herzog, concurring). The connection between the implicit standard adopted by
Chairman Herzog and the traditional approach of contract law was not explored by the
Board.
58. See, e.g., 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 56, § 533, at 6-7 ("Usually the meaning
that will be given [by the court] to expressions used in a contract transaction is the meaning
that one of the parties in good faith gave to them, if the other party knew or had reason to
know that he gave it.").
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context, the Board would be presented, under Option III, not with a

particular provision of a contract but with a subject that was not in the
contract. The Board would then be asked to determine whether, on the
basis of records and assertions concerning the parties' bargaining history,
the subject should be understood to be part of the agreement. The administrability problem would be greater in the latter instance by an order of
magnitude.59
Assume then that Options I and II are the only administrable rules.6 °
The argument for Option II is clear: In the process of negotiating a
contract, all subjects are either explicitly or implicitly brought into the
bargaining process. 6 1 The matters that were not integrated into the contract were traded off at some stage for the subjects dealt with in the
contract. To force either party to consider matters not covered explicitly in

the contract is, in effect, to open the contract to continual renegotiation.
Aware that the contract may be reopened later with demands for further
concessions, parties will offer few or limited concessions. Positions will be
taken with a view toward minimizing the risk of having to make concessions at a later stage when the contract is reopened by a demand for fresh

bargaining.
In light of this, what justificationcould there be for the requirementthat the
parties stand prepared to bargain over any mandatory subject during the term
of the contract?

59. The existence of a contract obviously will not resolve all ambiguities concerning an
agreement between parties, but it goes a long way toward that goal. The explicit terms
provide signals that aid the effort to interpret the agreement, and other provisions of the
contract provide additional information. To try to decide whether something that was not
mentioned in the contract should be considered implicitly part of it on the basis of
information that is independent of the contract itself involves all of the difficulties of
ordinary contract interpretation without the aid of the contract as a guide. Judge Posner has
pointed out the dangers of using outside evidence to interpret the parties' intentions about
subjects on which the written contract is silent. "[T]he use of extrinsic evidence to create
such obligations nowhere alluded to in the contract would unjustifiably deprive the parties of
the limitation of liabilities that is implicit in the negotiation of a written contract having a
definite expiration date." Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1993).
60. It is not at all clear to me that they are the only administrable rules. However, they
seem rather obviously to be easier to administer than Option III. In any event, it simplifies
the analysis in this section to focus on a comparison of Options I and II.
61.
Many items are not mentioned in a collective bargaining agreement either because
of concessions at the bargaining table or because one of the parties may have
considered it propitious to forego raising one subject in the hope of securing a more
advantageous deal on another. Subjects traded off or foregone should, under these
circumstances, be as irrevocably settled as those specifically covered and settled by
the agreement. To require bargaining on such subjects during midterm debases
initial contract negotiations.
Jacobs, 94 NLRB at 1232-33 (Reynolds, Member, dissenting).

19941

DUTY TO BARGAIN

1. The Honest Dealing Problem
I offer a theoretical framework useful in analyzing this question. Suppose the contract negotiation-execution process takes place over two periods. In the first, the parties negotiate the contract. In the second, the
employer decides, on the basis of information available only to her, whether
to subcontract work to another firm. The employer will subcontract work
to the other firm if the wage costs of the subcontractor are less than those
of the employer. Assume the wage paid by the employer is twenty dollars.
Three types of subcontractor could become available: one with a wage of
ten dollars, a second with a wage of twenty dollars, and a third with a wage
of forty dollars. The probability of each one becoming available is onethird. The employer will subcontract work only if the first subcontractor
becomes available. Assume the employees have no firm-specific skills so
that the employer suffers no productivity loss by replacing them with
lower-wage employees.6 2
Costless contractingcase. Under these assumptions, the value to the firm
of the subcontracting option is 1/3($10) = $3.33 (per employee). If the
employees offer a concession of four dollars, the employer should be
63
willing to forgo the right to subcontract work.
Thus, assuming no impediments to contracting-that is to say, zero
62. If employees possessed firm-specific skills, then their productivity within the firm
would exceed their productivity outside of the firm. It follows that replacement workers, who
would not possess the necessary firm-specific skills, would be less productive. What is an
example of a firm-specific skill? Suppose an employee discovers a particularly fast route to
the nearest restroom that saves several valuable seconds for work. Knowledge of the
short-cut may enhance her productivity relative to others within the firm, but will do nothing
to enhance her productivity at another worksite. General skills, such as learning how to be
courteous to customers, enhance an employee's productivity at several alternative worksites.
For the distinction, and the important economic insights that flow from it, see GARY S.
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 19-37 (2d ed. 1975).
63. This is a simple framework, and one that I will try to stick with for the remainder of
this discussion. A more rigorous approach would examine the agreement as a method of
maximizing the sum of the "net benefits" of the employment contract. On the employer's
side, the net benefit is the difference between the value of the employee's time and the wage.
On the employee's side, the net benefit is the difference between the wage and the
opportunity cost of providing labor. For an illustration of this approach, see Keith N. Hylton
& Maria O'Brien Hylton, RationalDecisions and Regulation of Union Entry, 34 VILL. L. REV.
145, 159-63 (1989).
One solution to the contracting problem discussed in this section is for the employer to
promise not to subcontract and to include an expectations damages measure in the contract.
Then the employees would be indifferent as to whether the employer breaches the contract.
The employer would have an incentive to breach the contract whenever she would gain as a
result of doing so. For a presentation of this argument in the context of contracting, see
A.M. POLINKSY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 31-34 (2d ed. 1989). The
problem with such an approach is that it requires a great deal of information on the
employer's part. The opportunity cost of labor varies over the workforce, and the employer
has to rely on the employees' reports. I therefore assume that transaction costs make this
solution to the contracting problem infeasible.
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transaction costs-the employer and the employees (collectively) will have
incentives to sign an agreement that restricts the employer's freedom to
subcontract whenever the employees are willing to offer a concession that
4
exceeds the expected value of the subcontracting option to the employer. 6
Informational asymmetry analysis. Suppose, however, that the employees
have no idea how likely it is that the low-cost subcontractor will become
available and must therefore rely on an estimate given by the employer.
They are unlikely to trust the employer. The employer's incentive is to overstate
the probability that the low-cost subcontractor will become available as long as
the estimate preserves some chance that an agreement can be reached. Knowing this, the employees will severely discount the employer's assessment of
the probability that a low-cost subcontractor will become available.
One response to this dilemma is for the employer to tell the truth and
then try to verify her report.65 But suppose any estimate of the likelihood
of the low-cost subcontractor appearing is unverifiable. In such a case the
employees are left with the work of assessing the validity of the employer's
statement. If all employers told the truth, there would be no problem.
Employees would accept the employer's estimate and use it as a basis for
offering a concession package in negotiations.
Given the assumptions made about information, however, it is unlikely
that an outcome in which all employers tell the truth could last-or more
precisely, could sustain itself as an equilibrium.6 6 If every employer told
the truth, then one employer could gain a significant competitive advantage by lying to its employees. 67 Reputational concerns would force some
employers to tell the truth. But the reputation market is generally insuffi64. This is a straightforward application of the Coase theorem, which holds that if

transactions costs are zero, parties to a contract will reach an agreement that maximizes

joint wealth. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).

65. If the employer's report were verifiable, then in equilibrium all relevant information
would be disclosed to employees. Why? Suppose an employer refused to provide verification;

then the employees would assume, quite rationally, that the employer was lying. For the
basic theory, see Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and
Applications, 12 BELL J. ECON. 380, 387-90 (1981).

66. By "equilibrium," I mean a set of decisions or plans of action that are self-supporting
in the sense that neither party has an incentive to adopt a different plan of action, given the
other party's plan. In the game theory literature, this is referred to as a Nash equilibrium.
See, e.g., ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION To GAME THEORY

33 (1989).
67. Consider a simple numerical example. The choices of the employer are to lie or tell
the truth. The employees base their behavior on the expected behavior of employers.
Suppose the share of contract benefits going to the truth-telling employer is $50. However,
by lying the employer can fool the employees into offering a larger concession and therefore
gain $100. But if all employers lie, employees will no longer trust them and the employer will
gain nothing. For two employers the payoffs are as follows:
truth
lie
truth
($50, $50)
($50, $100)
lie
($100, $50)
($0, $0)
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cient to generate truth-telling, otherwise there would be no need to
enforce legal restrictions on misrepresentation or fraud. It takes time for a
reputation to develop, and if employee turnover is sufficiently frequent,
some employers will not have a strong incentive to develop a reputation
for honest dealing with their employees.
Conversely, an outcome in which all employers lie to their employees is
also unlikely to be an equilibrium. If all employers lied, and employees
knew this, then the potential gains from convincing employees to offer
concessions could not be realized. Thus, the likely outcome is that some
fraction of employers will lie, and this, in turn, will cause some employees
to reduce their concessions, or willingness to offer concessions. In addition, some of the employees who offer concessions will find that they have
been taken advantage of by an employer who intentionally overstated the
likelihood of a low-cost subcontractor becoming available.
If lies are eventually exposed, and the sanction imposed on the employer
for lying (say, a strike) is sufficiently painful, the employer will tell the
truth. 68 But otherwise, the outcome will either be one in which some
employers lie and others tell the truth, while some employees accept the
employer's reports and others reject the employer's reports, or the cynical
outcome in which some employers lie and others tell the truth, while all
employees reject the employer's report.6 9
If the negotiation process only determined the allocation of rents arising
from an employment contract, one could argue that lying was not really a
problem because it would have no effect on the total wealth of the parties,
and so probably no effect on societal wealth. However, to the extent that
lying generates bargaining failure instances in which parties fail to reach a
mutually beneficial agreement, it does have real costs. Bargaining failure
leads to strikes, delay in contracting, and associated disruptions. In addition, when the parties make firm-specific investments, wealth transfers
incentives to enter into relationships that require such investaffect 70
ments.
2. Honest Dealing and Subcontracting: An Example
The following example should help to clarify the assumptions underlying
my argument. Suppose the employment contract negotiation process is
broken down into two periods. In the first, the employer reports the
probability of the low-cost subcontractor becoming available and then
68. This may seem inconsistent with the assumption that the employer cannot verify her
report. The inconsistency goes away if it is assumed that the employer cannot verify the
report before the contract is signed, or for several periods in the future. Thus, a lie or a
pattern of lying is discernible in the long run, but not within a short enough period for the
employer to verify the report or write a warranty in the contract with the union.
69. For a formal demonstration of these claims, see the Appendix.
70. See Keith N. Hylton & Maria O'Brien Hylton, Rent Appropriation and the Labor Law
Doctrine of Successorship, 70 B.U. L. REV. 821, 838-43 (1990).

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 83:19

proposes a minimum concession that would make it worthwhile for the
employer to enter into an agreement that bars subcontracting. In the
second, the employees either accept or reject the offer.
If the employer tells the truth and the employees offer a concession
based on the employer's report, then assume that the surplus generated by
the concession is one hundred dollars, which is then split evenly between
the parties. This might be the case if the employees were willing to pay two
hundred dollars to constrain the employer from subcontracting, while the
value to the employer of the freedom to subcontract was only one hundred
dollars. If the employer lies and the employees offer a concession based on
the employer's report, then assume that the employer transferred one
hundred dollars to herself from the employees. If lies are eventually
exposed, then let us add the further assumption that if the employer lies,
the employees will retaliate several periods later, costing the employer ten
dollars (in other words, appropriately capitalized, the cost of future retaliation is ten dollars).
Suppose that the probability that the employee will reject the employer's
report and refuse to make an acceptable concession is b. The fraction of
employers who tell the truth is a. The awards and action choices are shown
in Figure 2 below.
The ideal truth-telling outcome, in which employers tell the truth and
employees offer an acceptable concession based on the employer's report,
can be characterized as a = 1, b = 0. On the other hand, the worst possible
outcome is that in which employers always lie and employees never offer
concessions, which occurs when a = 0, and b = 1.71 For the example shown
in Figure 2, the truth-telling ideal is not an equilibrium.7 2
An employer will be indifferent as between lying and telling the truth
71. Using the terminology of game theory, the employer has a choice between two "pure"
strategies: "tell the truth" or "lie." The employee's pure strategies are: "offer concession"

(i.e., accept the employer's report) or "don't offer concession" (i.e., reject the employer's
report). The probability a permits the employer to adopt a more complicated strategy,
referred to as a "mixed" strategy, of randomly lying on some occasions and telling the truth
on others. On the definition of pure and mixed strategies, see

RASMUSEN,

supra note 66, at

69-70.
The two pure strategy equilibria of interest are a = 1, b = 0 and a = 0, b = 1. The mixed

strategy equilibrium is the outcome in which 0 < a < 1, 0 < b < 1, and neither party has an
incentive to change its plan of action.
It should be clear that the outcome a = 1, b = 1 (employer always tells the truth and

employee always rejects the employer's report) is unlikely to be an equilibrium. One

employee would realize that she is better off accepting the employer's report. The same goes
for a = 0, b = 0 (employer always lies, employee always accepts the employer's report),

because "you can't fool all of the people, all of the time." Abraham Lincoln, Speech in
Clinton, Ill. (Sept. 2, 1858), reprinted in BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 524 (15th ed.
1980).
72. Suppose employees accept the employer's report, so that b = 0. Then the employer's
gain from lying is $90, and the employer's gain from telling the truth is $50. It follows that
the employer will lie.
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,($50, $50)

(0,0)
(-100,90)

(0,-lO)
FIGURE

2

when the expected gain from lying is equal to the expected gain from a
truth-based concession. The expected gain from lying is b(-$10) +
(1 - b)($90). The expected gain to the employer from a truth-based concession is (1 minus b)($50). The employer will be indifferent when the probability of rejection, b, is four-fifths.7 3 The employee will be indifferent between
accepting and rejecting the employer's initial concession proposal when
the gain from accepting, a($50) + (1 - a)(-$100), is equal to that of
rejecting, $0. Indifference occurs when a = two-thirds. Thus, in equilibrium two-thirds of employers tell the truth and four-fifths of employee
groups reject initial concession proposals from the employer. The proportion of contract negotiations that are successful in the sense that the
parties reach an agreement based on truthful communication is only
thirteen percent.
73. This is the probability that equates the expected gain from a truth-based concession,
(1 - b)($50), with the expected gain from lying, b(-$10) + (1 - b)($90).
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Note that if the sanction imposed upon the employer for lying is zero
dollars instead of ten dollars, then the employer will always lie as long as
there is some positive probability that the employees will accept the
offer. 74 Because the employer will always lie, the employees will always
reject. The only equilibrium, then, is one in which employers sometimes lie
and sometimes tell the truth, and employees always reject the employer's
offers.
It follows that the assumption that the employer is eventually punished
for lying-or rewarded for telling the truth-is necessary in order to avoid
the outcome in which none of the proposed concessions are accepted. If
the sanction for lying (or conversely the reward for truth-telling) is large
enough, then the equilibrium outcome could be one in which employers
consistently tell the truth.
3. The Impact of Section 8(a)(5)
Assume that the decision to subcontract is a mandatory subject of
bargaining.75 The employees would be free to wait until the subcontractor
becomes available and then offer concessions. With a duty to bargain,
employers would no longer have an incentive to exaggerate the likelihood
of a low-cost subcontractor becoming available. If the employees doubted
the employer's estimate, as they would in any setting in which some
fraction of employers lied, they could wait and bargain over the subcontracting decision when the opportunity arose. 76 The employer would no longer
be able to confront employees with the implicit threat: "This is your last
chance to protect yourselves from the risk of losing your jobs. 77
A second channel through which the law affects behavior is its likely
impact on nonlegal sanctions applied to dishonest behavior. The finding of
a violation creates a label that justifies wariness on the part of the opposing party and enhances the likelihood of future sanctions (e.g., a strike or a
lockout). An increase in the penalty imposed on the employer for dishon74. If the sanction is $0, the expected gain from lying is b($0) + (1 - b)($90) =
(1 - b)($90). The expected gain from a truth-based concession is (1 - b)($50). For any
positive b, the employer's incentive is to lie. The two are equal, implying indifference, only
when b = 1, signifying that employees always reject. For a more rigorous presentation, see
Proposition 3 of the Appendix.
75. The decision to subcontract is, in most cases, a mandatory subject. See Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213 (1964) (concluding that contracting out is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining). However, in this section I will continue to use
hypotheticals.
76. Of course, the employer could lie about the cost estimate provided by the subcontractor, but the scope for exaggeration is considerably narrower at this stage. In general there
are two stages at which bargaining may take place. The first is when the employer has the
option to subcontract immediately. The second is an earlier stage, when the question is
whether the employer should agree not to contract out work over a certain period. Throughout this discussion I have focused on this earlier stage.
77. See Appendix, Figure A.2 and accompanying discussion.
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78
est reporting reduces the employer's incentive to report falsely. The
employees, aware that the employer's report is more likely to be valid,
would be more likely to accept the employer's report about the likelihood
of a subcontractor becoming available, and thus would be more likely to
accept the employer's contract proposal.
Of course, the duty to bargain is a default rule that opens certain
provisions of the contract to renegotiation, but the employer and the union
can contract around the default rule. The common methods of contracting
around the default rule are the adoption of a zipper clause or the adoption
of a management rights clause. The former relieves the parties of a
midterm obligation to bargain over certain terms not contained in the
contract.7 9 The latter asserts management's authority over certain production and organization decisions.8 ° In light of the potential for zipper and
management rights clauses, what can be said in favor of the "protection"
provided by the mandatory status of certain bargaining topics? If the
mandatory status can be defeated by contract, is the union not in the same
position as it would have been without the Act's bargaining rules?

Functions of default rules and entitlements. To answer this question, it is
helpful to distinguish between the functions of default rules and the
functions of entitlements in the labor bargaining context. I use the term
"default rule" here to refer to a rule specifying the conduct that is
required of an individual who complies with the duty to bargain. I use the
8
term "entitlement" to refer to the property rights recognized by the law. '
The duty to bargain is a combination of a default rule governing the
process of bargaining and an entitlement to act unilaterally. The bargaining default rule requires the party subject to the duty to meet with the

78. This is demonstrated in the Appendix.
79. On zipper clauses, see supra note 20 and accompanying text. The availability of zipper

clauses belies the claim that Section 8(a)(5) leads parties to adopt a stingy bargaining
strategy. The parties can avoid that incentive effect by including a zipper clause among the
bargaining items.
80. That such clauses could be consistent with the duty to bargain in good faith was
established in NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 410 (1952).
81. It is common in the literature to use the expressions "default rule" and "entitlement"
as if they were interchangeable. However, in this section I want to distinguish between rules
that specify standards of conduct and rules that allocate property rights. Calabresi and
Melamed noted that virtually all legal rules could be described as specifying entitlements

and rules protecting those entitlements (property, liability, and inalienability rules). See
generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). The Calabresi/
Melamed scheme can be expanded. In determining whether a liability or property rule will
be enforced, a court will examine the defendant's conduct to see whether it meets the

standard specified by the law. Thus, an expanded version of the Calabresi/Melamed analysis
would allow for entitlement rules, enforcement rules, and conduct rules. The law of Section

8(a)(5) can be viewed as specifying rules in each of these categories. In this section of the
text, and through most of this article, I focus on entitlement and conduct rules.
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other party and to disclose relevant information. The entitlement rule
assigns the right to act unilaterally with respect to some bargaining topic
82
and conditions that right on satisfaction of bargaining obligations.
In the subcontracting case, one can specify four combinations of default
and entitlement rules. The first regime assigns both the default rule and
the entitlement to the employer, in the sense that the employer is under no
obligation to bargain about a subcontracting decision, and the employer
has the right to act unilaterally. The second regime assigns both rules to
the union: the union has no bargaining obligation and can veto the employer's decision to subcontract. The third regime assigns the bargaining rule
to the union and the entitlement to subcontract to the employer. Thus,
under the third regime, the employer has a duty to bargain and also the
right to act unilaterally if it satisfies its duty. In the fourth regime, the
union can veto the employer's subcontracting decision, but only after
bargaining to impasse.
Because the subcontracting decision is generally mandatory, Section
8(a)(5) places the parties under the third regime. If subcontracting were
not a mandatory topic, then the parties would be under the first regime.
The second and fourth regimes have not been extensively treated in the
literature. However, a brief consideration of the reasons for rejecting the
second and fourth regimes provides insight into the desirability of Section
8(a)(5).
The feature shared by the second and fourth regimes is that they shift
the entitlement to act unilaterally to the employee. Thus, under the second
and fourth regimes, no employer can subcontract without first getting the
approval of the employees. This would be quite a dramatic change from
the common-law assignment; Section 8(a)(5) merely conditions the employer's right to subcontract on satisfaction of bargaining obligations. Assuming that the common-law assignment is correct in the sense that the
subcontracting entitlement is assigned to the party that places the highest
value on it, the second and fourth regimes increase the likelihood of
strategic bargaining failure by giving employees an incentive to expropriate
the value that the employer assigns to the subcontracting right. The second
and fourth regimes maximize the employees' incentives to hold out in
bargaining.
Returning to the choice between the Section 8(a)(5) default and the
common-law default rule, recall that the employer knows the likelihood of
a low-cost subcontractor becoming available while the employees do not.
When it was the responsibility of the employees to bid for the restriction
82. Although we both rely to some extent on the framework introduced in Calabresi and
Melamed, supra note 81, this analysis differs greatly from that of Wachter and Cohen, supra

note 3. Wachter and Cohen define a "bargaining rule" as a new form of protection for

certain entitlements. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1371. My aim here is to show

that the duty to bargain is a combination of common-law default and entitlement rules.
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against subcontracting, the possibility of being taken advantage of led
some employees to bid too low or to avoid bidding at all. Under the
Section 8(a)(5) default, the reverse occurs: employees, ignorant of the
value of the restriction on subcontracting, will ask for too much from the
employer when she offers a concession in order to gain absolute freedom
over the subcontracting decision. Some employees will refuse to accept the
employer's concession, viewing it as inadequate. There will be instances in
which a mutually beneficial concession could have been reached, but the
parties will fail to reach agreement.
The dynamics of bargaining remain the same as in the original statement
of the subcontracting example. If all employers tell the truth and employees believe them, then at least one employer could gain by reporting
falsely. Provided that the sanction for lying is low, in equilibrium some
percentage of employers will report falsely and some percentage of employees will reject the employer's report.
Once again, the question surfaces: In light of the parties'freedom to opt
out of the mandatory bargaining regime, has any significant change been
effected by the default rule of Section 8(a)(5)? I claim that there are three
changes worth noting.
Information disclosure duty. First, the default rule changes the duty to
provide information. The common-law default rules do not require the
employer to provide information to verify her report of the probability that
a low-cost subcontractor will become available, though indirect disclosure
incentives exist.8 3 Under Section 8(a)(5), the employer is obligated to
provide such information.84 Of course, whatever the rule, the employer
still holds the informational advantage in this example so it is possible that
she will provide false information to the union in order to lend credibility
to a false report. However, the provision of false information is also a
violation of the Act.85 The information-provision requirement of Section
83. There are several indirect disclosure incentives provided by contract law. The doctrine
governing unilateral mistakes is an example of a common law rule that encourages information disclosure. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of

Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5-8 (1978).
84. Wachter Constr., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 215, 216 (1993) (employer's refusal to provide
subcontractor information violates Section 8(a)(5)); AT&T Co., Network Sys. Customer
Support & Operations Div., 309 N.L.R.B. 925, 930 (1992) (employer violated Section 8(a)(5)
by refusing to completely comply with a union's request for subcontractor names, locations,
their number of workers, and work descriptions); Fawcett Printing Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. 964,
976 (1973) (employer must disclose to the union, at its request, information on its dealings
with subcontractors, including names, correspondence, contract terms, and products).
85. Association of D.C. Liquor Wholesalers, 300 N.L.R.B. 224, 230 (1990) (employers'
provision of false information about company officials in response to a union request
violated Section 8(a)(5)). But cf Fremont Ford Sales, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 1290, 1290 n.7
(1988) (declaring that successor in a dealership takeover did not violate Section 8(a)(5) by
providing false information to the union before the successor was in control of the business
and thus before the successor had a bargaining relationship with the union).
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8(a)(5) works in a manner similar to the explanation recently provided for
the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale86 and analogous contract doctrines: 8 7 it
encourages the informationally advantaged party to disclose information.88
The enhanced disclosure incentives provided by Section 8(a)(5) are
designed to reduce the number of instances in which the parties fail to
reach a mutually beneficial agreement. The bargaining failure observed in
the subcontracting example results from the strategic use of information by
the employer. Because both parties are aware of the value of information,
the employer has an incentive to dissemble and the employees have an
incentive to discount the employer's reports.
Return to the earlier example: assume that with probability one-third
each, a subcontractor with a wage level of ten dollars, twenty dollars, or
forty dollars could become available and offer a contract. If the employer
were free to contract out at-will, the value to the employer of the subcontracting option would be $3.33 per employee. If each employee was willing
to pay $4 for an agreement prohibiting the employer from contracting out,
the surplus or net benefit from an agreement would be $0.67 per employee. If the employer knows that the workers are willing to pay $4 each
for a provision barring subcontracting, her incentive would be to report
that the value of the subcontracting option was $3.99. Aware of this
incentive, employees would discount the employer's report, resulting in
failure to reach agreement. Section 8(a)(5) enhances disclosure of private
information through two routes: (1) the bargaining requirement itself

86. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854). Hadley v. Baxendale crystallized the foreseeability

requirement in the calculation of damages for breach of contract:
[T]he damages.., should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either

arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of
contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of
the breach of it.
Id. at 151.

87. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 87. "Penalty default" rules in the Ayres and
Gertner analysis are rules that require an informationally advantaged party to disclose
information or suffer some sort of penalty. For example, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is a
penalty default because it requires a promisee who expects to suffer unusual damages as the
result of contract breach to disclose those damages or forfeit any claim for the nonforeseeable portion of loss. Alternatively, one can view the penalty defaults as rules that minimize
opportunism in contract settings. For an analysis of contract rules that control or deter
opportunism, see generally Muris, supra note 2.
88. This feature of the duty to bargain was first noted in Stewart J. Schwab, Collective

Bargainingand the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 272 (1987) and is emphasized in
Benjamin Duke, Note, Regulating the Internal Labor Market: An Information-ForcingApproach to DecisionBargainingover PartialRelocations, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 932 (1993); see also

Wachter & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1373-74 (discussing information-provision requirements
and strategic bargaining).
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forces the employer to signal the importance of subcontracting and (2)
the penalties applied to refusals to provide valid information.
The duty to provide information could reduce the wealth of the parties
90
by destroying the employer's incentive to make certain investments. For
example, a duty to disclose trade secrets to the union would limit the
employer's ability to reap the rewards from certain innovations. But the
law does not require the employer to reveal such information. 9Employers
1
are generally not required to reveal information on preferences or confidential plans of action. 92 The scope of the duty seems generally to be
consistent with the theory of this article: it enhances the union's ability to
prevent opportunistic wealth transfers, but does not permit the union to
extort from the employer a share of the returns from confidential process
innovations.

Partialentitlementshifts and incentives to deal honestly. Second, in conditioning the entitlement to subcontract on satisfaction of bargaining obligations,
Section 8(a)(5) brings about a partial entitlement shift that enhances the
likelihood of a mutually beneficial agreement. The reason is that the
potential gain from an agreement will be large relative to the rents that
could be earned by exploiting an informational advantage. This suggests
that even in the absence of a duty to provide information, the employer
would have a greater incentive to participate honestly in the contracting
93
process under the Section 8(a)(5) default than under the common-law default.
To see this, return to the example: as before, a subcontractor with a
89. I wish to thank Mike Harper for bringing this to my attention.

at 15-17.
90. For a general discussion of this potential effect, see Kronman, supra note 83,
it asserts
91. For example, Truitt requires the employer to reveal financial data only when
employer
an inability to pay. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956). If the

merely asserts a desire not to pay a higher wage, no disclosure obligation arises under Truitt.
See, e.g., Graphic Communications Int'l Union, Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168, 1170-71
(7th Cir. 1992).
92. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 319 (1979) (establishing confidentiality
defense).
93. In general, the party offering to settle a contract compares the benefits of settling at
the terms of her offer with the costs of having her offer rejected. The larger the benefits from
will
the contract to the party making the offer, the greater the incentive to make an offer that
be accepted.

Suppose two parties engage in one-shot, "take-it-or-leave-it" negotiating, and the seller
makes an offer to the buyer. The cost to the seller of supplying the good is known to both
parties, but the value of the good to the buyer is not known. The "marginal revenue" to the
seller from increasing the price on her offer is simply the probability that the buyer's
valuation exceeds the price. The marginal cost is the foregone profit if the buyer's valuation

and the
does not exceed the price. It is easy to show that as the buyer's demand weakens,
price to the
supply cost to the seller falls, the seller has a greater incentive to offer a low
(discussbuyer. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 22-23 (1989)
Contract
ing model of bargaining). For a more general discussion, see Eric L. Talley,
Compensation
Renegotiation and the Liquidated Damages Rule: Vindication for the Just
Law
Principle? (April 19, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Georgetown
Journal).
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wage level of ten dollars, twenty dollars, or forty dollars could become
available and offer a contract with a probability of one-third each. Under
the common-law regime, the value to the employer of the subcontracting
option is $3.33 per employee. If each employee is willing to pay four
dollars for an agreement prohibiting the employer from contracting out,
the surplus or net benefit from an agreement is $0.67 per employee.
However, to the extent that the employer can gain a larger share of the
surplus by exaggerating the probability that a low-cost subcontractor will
become available, the employer has an incentive to lie.
Consider the value of the employer's right to subcontract. Under Section 8(a)(5), the value to the employer of the subcontracting option is a
function of the probability of an agreement. An agreement is reached if
and only if the employee representative does not reject the employer's
contract proposal. If b is defined as the probability that the employee
representative will reject the employer's proposal, then the probability of
an agreement is simply 1 - b. Assume, for simplicity, that the subcontracting entitlement is worthless to the employer if the parties do not reach an
agreement on the employer's initial proposal. Under Section 8(a)(5), the
value of the subcontracting entitlement to the employer is:
($3.33)(1 - b) + ($0)b,
or simply $3.33(1 - b).
The reasoning proceeds as follows. Under Section 8(a)(5), the employer
retains the right to contract out, but is required to bargain before acting
unilaterally. The value of the right to subcontract is therefore dependent
likelihood of reaching agreement quickly in the bargaining proon the
94
cess.

How much would an employer pay under Section 8(a)(5) for absolute
freedom over subcontracting? Put another way, how much of a concession
would the employer be willing to make in exchange for a management
rights provision over subcontracting? Because absolute freedom is worth
$3.33 per employee, and the employer already "owns" $3.33(1 - b) under
Section 8(a)(5), the employer would be willing to pay no more than the
value of the remainder, $3.33b. Thus, under Section 8(a)(5), the maximum
the employer would be willing to pay for an agreement in which she gains
absolute freedom over the subcontracting decision is $3.33b.
A policy of truth-telling is encouraged because it simultaneously enhances the value of the employer's entitlement and reduces the amount
the employer must pay to gain absolute freedom over subcontracting. If
94. Specifically, in this model the value of the subcontracting option under Section 8(a)(5)

is the product of its value under the common-law regime, $3.33, and the probability of fast

acceptance of the employer's proposal, (1 - b).
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the employer tells the truth, the employees generally will not have an
95
incentive to reject the employer's proposal. The employees prefer an
agreement based on an honest report over no agreement. Because a policy
of truth telling implies b = 0 in equilibrium, the value of the employer's
entitlement to subcontract under section 8(a)(5) will be $3.33-the same
as in the common-law regime. Alternatively, because honest dealing enshift
hances the value of a party's entitlements, the partial entitlement
96
effected by Section 8(a)(5) increases the return to honest dealing.
The legal definition of impasse plays an important role in this argument.
If the employer could make an offer that she is sure the employees would
reject and then declare impasse when the rejection occurred, bargaining
law would discourage honest dealing by the employer. Employers who lied
to their employees would be free to act unilaterally after declaring impasse, while those who dealt honestly would find themselves obligated to
engage in lengthy bargaining sessions. The doctrine avoids creating such
incentives by requiring courts to look behind the employer's declaration
that the
that impasse has been reached to see whether there is evidence
97
parties could not reach agreement after good faith negotiations.
My argument may strike law and economics aficionados as counterintuitive because it implies that an entitlement should be assigned to the
98
bargaining party who values it least. The orthodox view would find such a
policy to be wasteful because it generates transactions costs associated
with numerous foreseeable efforts to contract around the initial assignment. However, the orthodox view is incorrect in this context for two
reasons. First, the entitlement shift effected by Section 8(a)(5) is only
partial;that is to say Section 8(a)(5) only shifts the entitlement when there
is a failure to satisfy the duty to bargain. Second, informational asymmetry
95. See the Appendix for a demonstration in an economic model of bargaining.
96. An increase in the reward to honest reporting (equivalently, an increase in the penalty
for dishonest reporting) on the employer's part will increase the probability that the
employer reports honestly. See Proposition 2 of the Appendix. Because a policy of lying
reduces the value of the employer's entitlement, Section 8(a)(5) can be viewed as enhancing
the penalty for dishonesty.
97. See, e.g., United Contractors, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 72, 72 (1979) (noting that the NLRB
"must take some cognizance of the reasonableness of the position taken by an employer in
the course of bargaining negotiations"); Carpenter Sprinkler Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 974, 975
(1978) (concluding that union did not bargain in bad faith because the question of whether
employer would accept a tentative multi-employer collective bargaining agreement did not
amount to "insistence" that employer do so); Meltox Mfg. Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1323
(1976) (concluding that employer bargained in bad faith, based on employer's statements
that certain terms of employment were "nonnegotiable," failure to give reasons for inflexibility, strategy of responding to union concessions With increasingly unfavorable proposals, and
failure to reach agreement for 11 years).
98. In the law and economics literature, one typically sees the argument that entitlements
should be awarded to the party that values them most in order to avoid the transaction costs
generated by contracting around the default rule. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 71 (1983).
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is itself a source of transaction costs that stand in the way of Coasean
bargaining. 99 One must compare the costs of contracting around the entitlement to the welfare losses associated with bargaining failure. There is
nothing in theory that rules out the possibility that bargaining failure could
be minimized by awarding an entitlement to the party who values it the
least.
Second-best outcomes. Finally, unlike the zero transaction cost Coasean
analysis, 00 the theory here predicts that there will be instances in which
the parties will not take advantage of an opportunity to make a mutually
beneficial contract. In light of this, it makes sense to consider the desirability of second-best outcomes, those situations in which opportunities to
increase joint wealth are not exploited. Here, there is an obvious change
effected by the Section 8(a)(5) default rule. In those cases in which deals
are not reached, the employees hold on to their right to bargain with
respect to the subcontracting decision. In short, instead of an outcome in
which lack of protection is observed, over-protection is more likely under
the mandatory bargaining default. Under the no-duty default, when the
employees offered too little in the way of concessions or refused to offer
concessions at all, they were at risk of losing their jobs the moment a
low-cost subcontractor became available. Under the Section 8(a)(5) default, the same group of employees most likely will have refused the
employer's terms attached to the zipper clause. They remain under the
duty to bargain framework of the Act. They will be allowed an opportunity
to offer concessions as an alternative to subcontracting.
Some Remaining Observations:Ethically ConstrainedEmployers, PrivateSolutions to the Honest Dealing Problem, and the Uniqueness of the Bargaining
Relationship.
Ethically constrained employers. My analysis of the honest dealing problem assumes that the employer is economically motivated, and that the
99. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 ECON. PERSP. 113

(1987).
100. I refer again to the Coase theorem, which holds that if transactions costs are zero,
the final outcome will not be affected by the allocation of entitlements. The reason is that

parties will exhaust all opportunities for joint wealth gains. See Coase, supra note 64, at 2-6.
The "zero-transaction-cost-Coasean analysis" is the benchmark that many economists
start with in analyzing the social costs and benefits of alternative assignments of a legal
entitlement. Transaction costs are then considered in the second stage of the analysis. See,
e.g., Hylton & Hylton, supra note 70, at 836-46 (analyzing alternative successorship rules by
first considering zero transaction cost case and then taking various transaction costs into
account). The empirical question that typically remains is whether the transaction costs
identified are important enough to justify a specific entitlement, for if transaction costs are
insignificant, the specification of the entitlement has no effect on the final outcome of the
contracting process. For an analysis of collective bargaining from a zero transaction cost
perspective, see Schwab, supra note 88, at 245.
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profit incentive determines the employer's willingness to lie or tell the
truth. However, some employers may feel ethically constrained to tell the
truth to their employees. Given that this is true, what are the implications
for the usefulness of Section 8(a)(5)?
If all employers deal honestly, then clearly Section 8(a)(5) serves no
useful purpose. If a sufficiently large percentage of employers tell the
truth, then employees will accept the employer's proposal. They prefer a
fair deal to no deal at all, and if a very large fraction of employers tell the
truth, the best bet for the employee will be to accept the employer's
contract proposal.1" 1 There will be no bargaining failure-that is no failure
in the sense that the parties fail to reach an agreement.
'
But there is a problem with this result: The employers who are not
ethically constrained will lie to their employees and thereby gain a competitive advantage. Their share of the employer population will increase.
Before long, the probability of a true report will fall to the point where the
rational employee will reject the employer's offer, and bargaining failure
will again be observed. Significantly, for this degenerative process to occur,
we need have only one employer who does not feel constrained to tell the
truth.
Privatesolutions to the honest dealing problem. If employers could develop
stable reputations, then there would be little need for a duty to bargain in
good faith. Bargaining failure would be limited to those relationships
where the employer failed to develop a reputation for honesty. Part of the
cost of informational asymmetry is that bargaining failure occurs even in
cases in which the employer is dealing honestly.
Implicit in the preceding analysis is the assumption that the reputation
market is imperfect. Employees turn over too frequently, reputations
mature slowly, and there is an inadequate incentive for anyone to collect
and disseminate reputational information.
One solution is for the employer to offer a warranty or post a bond to
support a claim of honesty. For such a solution to be effective, the
information that the employee would need to verify the employer's report
would have to reveal itself within the period of the warranty. For example,
if the employer claims that the low-cost subcontractor will become available with a probability one-third, the employees must be able to verify that
report for the warranty to be useful. But suppose the information necessary to verify such a report is not available within the period of the
contract, even though it may eventually become available. In this circumstance, how would one prevent a dishonest employer from posting a bond?
How would one determine whether the employer violated her promise not
to lie?
101. For a demonstration, see Proposition 4 of the Appendix.
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Yet another problem with warranties is that real world contracting is
more complicated than the simple model presented in this article."°2 There
are too many variables of concern to the parties. The transaction costs of
warranting the validity of a hundred claims could be prohibitive.
Uniqueness of the bargaining relationship. The theory developed so far
suggests that the incentive effects of Section 8(a)(5) should be observed in
any bargaining environment. The question then arises: Why is there not a
general duty to bargain and to disclose information in all settings in which
bargaining takes place? A different form of the same question is: Why is
there not a general duty to bargain with respect to all matters of bargaining. The latter question is addressed in the remainder of this paper.
However, the answer to both questions is the same.
The aim of bargaining law should be to minimize bargaining failure.
With respect to some matters, the costs of bargaining failure (missed
opportunities for wealth-enhancement, delay, or strikes) will be outweighed by the benefits of excusing parties from bargaining obligations.
For example, information on trade secrets, were it disclosed by the employer, might in theory reduce the probability of bargaining failure. However, it would also undermine incentives to innovate. Nevertheless, in
other contexts a duty to disclose information might minimize bargaining
failure-for example, car-buying and house-buying. Yet we do not observe
a general duty to bargain analogous to Section 8(a)(5).
What distinguishes the employment relationship from many other contexts in which bargaining takes place is that it is a relatively long-term
contractual relationship in which both sides make match-specific investments that are profitable or generate the greatest profit only if the relationship continues.1" 3 This cannot generally be said of the bargaining
relationship between the car dealer and car purchaser, or the agent selling
a house and the house purchaser. When a car dealer and a potential buyer
102. Many standard subjects of concession bargaining can be evaluated only through the
use of information privately held by the employer. The subcontracting clause has been
discussed in this section of the text; however, there are other clauses that could have been

used as substitutes for this discussion. For example, "trigger mechanisms" for the restoration of wages and benefits often depend on the employer's profits reaching a certain
specified level. Evaluation of work guarantees-assurances that the plant will be kept

running-requires information on the likelihood that the employer's business will remain
healthy over the period of the contract. Agreements to share the gains from cost reductions
or productivity increases can be evaluated only through the use of the employer's private
information. For an illuminating discussion of standard subjects of concession bargaining,
see

LOUGHRAN, NEGOTIATING A LABOR CONTRACT: A MANAGEMENT HAND406-07 (1984).
103. The general theory of match-specific or transaction-specific investments is developed
in OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). See also Michael L. Wachter & Randall E. Wright, The Economics of Internal
CHARLES S.

BOOK

LaborMarkets, in

THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

86, 86-108 (Daniel

J.B. Mitchell & Mahmood A. Zaidi eds., 1990) (developing theory in labor context).
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fail to reach an agreement, the buyer simply goes to another dealer. When
the employer and the union fail to reach an agreement, however, the
parties cannot exit the relationship so easily, and the costs of failure are
much more significant. t "
B. THE MANDATORY/PERMISSIVE DISTINCTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE

SCOPE OF MANDATORY BARGAINING

The preceding section of this article presented a theory of the incentive
effects of the duty to bargain in good faith. In this section, I present a
theory of the scope of bargaining obligations. In other words, I take the
incentive effects as given and ask whether they are desirable in certain
areas.
1. Permissive "in Favor of the Union"
In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 0 5 the Court articulated the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects. The
employer in Borg-Warner sought two provisions in its contract with the
union. One, the so-called "recognition" clause, would have required the
substitution of the local affiliate for the international union that had been
certified by the Board. 10 6 The second, referred to as the "ballot" clause,
would have required the union to submit each strike decision to a vote by
the employees in the bargaining unit.' °7 The Court held that both of these
provisions concerned permissive subjects, and that the employer violated
the duty to bargain in good faith by pressing its demands for them;
specifically, the employer violated the duty by linking these demands to the
resolution of mandatory bargaining subjects. 108
The rationales for finding the subjects permissive differed slightly. The
104. The costs of failure flow primarily from three sources: transaction costs and the

postponement of net benefits that result from delay, foregone net benefits that result from
failure to reach a mutually beneficial agreement on some subject, and the losses that result

from strike activity. There are no empirical estimates of the magnitude of these losses, and it
would be very hard to arrive at such an estimate. Consider, for example, the difficulty of
measuring the costs of strike activity. One would have to measure the costs to both parties

that result from lost work days, cumbersome bargaining practices designed to minimize the
likelihood of a strike, stockpiling (i.e., accumulating inventory to sell in case of a strike),
efforts by third parties to diversify sources of supply, and other practices adopted to
minimize the costs suffered by participants and third parties during a strike. Perhaps the best
data on the costs of strike activity are provided in George R. Neumann, The Predictability of
Strikes: Evidence from the Stock Market, 33 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. REV. 525 (1980). Neumann

reports that a "firm with an equity value of $500 million 14 days before a strike would find its
value diminished by $4.6 million after the strike has lasted 14 trading days." Id. at 531. On

the date of the announcement of the strike, the firm's equity declines by 0.4 percent. Id. at
529.
105. 356 U.S. 342, 345 (1958).

106. Id. at 345.
107. Id. at 345.
108. Id. at 348-49.
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ballot clause was permissive because it dealt with the internal functions of
the union.1" 9 That is, it dealt only with the relationship between the union
and the employees (union and nonunion), as opposed to the relationship
between the employer and the union."' Because it addressed the relationship between the employees and their union, it also allowed the employer
to speak directly to the employees without going through the bargaining
representative.1 To some extent, the recognition clause suffered from the
same problem, but it had the additional consequence of effectively reversing a Board certification.11 2 The Court noted that while the Act permits
the parties to agree to bring a new party
into the agreement, the certified
113
representative could not be excluded.
Internal functions permissiveness and agency cost theory. With respect to
the ballot clause, the reasoning of Borg-Warner has fostered the notion
that, in labor negotiations, any attempt to interfere with the internal
functions of the opposing party implicates rules governing permissive
subjects. If, for example, the union demanded that the employer submit
lockout decisions to shareholders for ratification and insisted upon this
provision to the point of impasse, it would violate the duty to bargain in
good faith. The Court's argument with respect to the recognition clause
suggests the alternative theory that provisions that are inconsistent with
the Board's certification process are necessarily permissive subjects.
From a contract theory perspective, the inconsistent provisions half of
the Borg-Warner decision seems easily justifiable, but the internal functions
theory of permissiveness is more problematic. Consider, for example, a
union's proposal that the managers submit certain decisions, such as the
decision to lockout the employees, to a vote by the shareholders. Ignoring
the practical administrative problems generated by such an agreement,1 14
it is difficult to see what is wrong with such a proposal. It would eliminate
management's freedom to impose a lockout in instances in which the firm's
owners did not support the measure. In many instances, it would be very
costly for the firm to submit decisions to the shareholders as they typically
meet too infrequently for their input to come in a timely fashion. But that

109. Id. at 349-50.
110. Id. at 350.
111. Id. at 350. Such direct bargaining violates Section 8(a)(5). See, e.g., Safeway Trails,
Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 930, 932-33 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
112. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 350.
113. Id.
114. Considerations such as whether the shareholders meet frequently enough to consider
such questions in a timely fashion are relevant here. Shareholder meetings are generally held
annually. ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 358 (1986). Special meetings can be held at
other times at the Board of Director's discretion, or as provided for in the articles of
incorporation or bylaws. Id.
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is no reason for preventing the union from pushing for such a provision in
the contract. When a shareholder ratification rule would be costly, management would respond by demanding that the union make very substantial
concessions before agreement could be reached. In other cases, particularly when the ownership of the firm is concentrated in a few hands, a
question can be submitted directly to the owners at little cost.
Another argument against internal functions permissiveness is that the
membership of the union, and, similarly, the ownership of the firm, is too
5
dispersed and too uninformed to make a good decision." That is why the
shareholders delegate certain decisions to management and why the union
members delegate certain decisions to their representatives. But this argument is not persuasive in the examples under consideration. Union officials
who agree to submit a strike vote to the employees will feel pressure to
explain their decisions. Lack of interest on the part of employees may
reflect nothing more than a settled pattern of inadequate provision of
information by union officials. An enhanced flow of information may
increase the interest of employees in the decisions of their union representatives. Such an outcome would be entirely consistent with the aims of the
6
NLRA and, especially, the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments."
Efforts to align the incentives of representatives with those they represent should be encouraged because they reduce the agency costs inherent
in large organizations. Agency costs result when an agent makes decisions
17 In
that differ from those that would have been chosen by the principal.
the corporation, the principals are the owners (the shareholders). In the
union, the "principal" is the membership as a group. In the case of the
firm, the costs of the agency relationship arise from several sources:
reduction in the value of the firm because the market perceives that
managers are likely to make decisions that diverge from those that the
owners would make, the costs incurred in monitoring managers, and the
costs incurred by efforts to reverse or correct management decisions that
are reversible. There are analogous costs in the union setting. Agency costs
are real because they reduce the benefits the organization provides to the
principal. If the principal's activities are socially desirable, then the private
115. I refer to the rational apathy problem. Both the excessive cost of keeping all the

shareholders informed and the individual shareholders' "free rider" incentive to let the
other shareholders bear the costs of participating in corporate affairs induce rationally
apathetic shareholder behavior towards corporate decisions. Id. at 94.

116. The Landrum-Griffin Amendments, also known as the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988), require labor organizations and officials
to make reports on their financial transactions. The amendments were aimed at solving the
problems caused by union leadership's widespread corruption and its undemocratic control
of union affairs. GORMAN, supra note 12, at 6.
117. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
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agency costs borne by the principal are also social costs 1 8-they reflect,
dollar for dollar, a reduction in society's wealth.
Borg-Warner reveals a facet of the agency cost problem that has not been
emphasized in the literature. To the extent the agency problem affects
third parties, those parties will have incentives to propose alterations in
governance structure. Thus, efforts by the union to make managers inform
shareholders of their decisions and seek ratification, and efforts by managers to make union representatives inform employees of their decisions and
take their input into account are predictable and desirable responses to
organizational inefficiencies. Indeed, if the parties are fully informed, the
proposed solutions would be adopted when and only when they increase
the joint wealth of the parties.1 19 Suppose, for example, that managers
impose lockouts in instances in which the owners would not. The owners
experience some disutility from this practice, but altering the governance
structure is too costly. However, if the union makes a concession in
exchange for an alteration in the governance structure, the change may
benefit all parties.
Suppose for example, the owners lose two hundred dollars per year from
ill-considered lockouts by managers. 2 ° Suppose the amortized cost of
altering the governance structure to require shareholder approval of lockouts is two hundred fifty dollars per year and that the union experiences a
disutility of three hundred dollars per year as a result of lockouts imposed
by management. Because, in this example, the cost to the employer of
altering the governance structure in a way that permits more careful or
detailed monitoring of managers exceeds the benefits to shareholders, it
follows that the firm will have little incentive to independently eliminate
the agency costs. 121 The solution is for the union to offer a concession, say
one hundred, in exchange for the alteration in the governance structure.
The concession pays for the alteration and generates a surplus to be
shared among the parties.
Although agency cost theory suggests that matters concerning internal
functions should be brought within the scope of mandatory bargaining,
there remains one argument favoring the internal functions permissiveness
118. If the principal's goals are not socially desirable then at least some of the agency
costs are private costs to the principal, but not costs to society. For example, consider a
principal who wishes the managers of her firm to poison a stream of water.
119. This is true because under the zero transaction cost assumption, parties would
exploit all opportunities for mutual gain. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
120. Usually this kind of cost will be realized in one lump sum-the result of one bad
decision. But if we imagine these decisions occurring once every five years, then we may
convert the cost into an annual flow; this is what I am assuming in the text.
121. This example illustrates the sense in which Jensen and Meckling referred to agency
costs as something other than signals of inefficiency. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 117, at
317-19, 357. The costs are incurred because there is no alternative that is superior. It would

be an example of a Nirvana fallacy to argue that the mere existence of these costs justifies a
conclusion that the organization is socially inefficient.
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doctrine. If the internal functions of the union fell within the scope of
mandatory bargaining, then the union could not unilaterally alter them
without violating the duty to bargain. The same holds true for the employer. If a firm's decision to partially exit a business is not a subject of
mandatory bargaining,"' then it seems that a decision to alter its governance structure should not be either.
On balance, it is difficult to say whether internal functions permissiveness is justifiable on economic grounds. To the extent permissiveness
permits a firm or union to choose the organizational form that best meets
its needs, it is entirely defensible. However, there is no good contract
theory justification for a policy that shelters decisionmakers and increases
agency costs.
Recognition bargainingand core permissiveness. The alternative theory of
permissiveness suggested by Borg-Warner is based on the Board's authority
to defend the integrity of its election machinery. The recognition clause
crossed the line by requiring the substitution of a bargaining agent other
than the one elected by the employees. Thus, any attempt to insist on a
substitute for the Board-certified bargaining agent violates the duty to
bargain in good faith.
As I have suggested, this theory of permissiveness seems defensible. An
employer who bargains for a recognition clause similar to that at issue in
Borg-Warner is essentially trying to purchase votes for an alternative union.
In this sense, the ballot clause is indistinguishable from a yellow-dog
12 3
contract in which the employees agree never to join a union.
124
Such strategies set up a "prisoner's dilemma" incentive structure. The
alternative union proposed in the recognition clause may be accepted even
if the employees are generally worse off if represented by the alternative.
Suppose that employees one and two are willing to pay one dollar for the
Board-certified union and zero dollars for the alternative proposed by the
employer. Suppose employee three is willing to pay twenty-five cents for
the alternative and zero dollars for the Board-certified union. By offering
an award of one dollar and fifty cents to the first employee who switches
his allegiance from the Board-certified to the alternative union, the employer can arrange for an agreement to substitute the alternative union for
the Board-certified union. But the wealth of the employees would be lower
under the alternative union ($1.75 instead of $2.00).125 As with other
122. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981).
123. Wachter & Cohen place such agreements in the class of "inalienability rules"; labor
law grants employees an inalienable right to join a union. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note
3, at 1367-68.
124. See Hylton & Hylton, supra note 63, at 194-97.

125. Suppose employee three is willing to pay one dollar for the alternative. Then the

employer's proposal would result in an increase in total wealth ($2.50 instead of $2.00).

However, the increase would be accompanied by a transfer of wealth from the pro-Board-

certified union majority.
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Prisoner's Dilemma examples, allowing recognition to become a part of
the bargaining process introduces the possibility of an agreement in which
the employees voluntarily throw themselves into the least desirable outcome. It is in this sense that bargaining over recognition potentially "interferes" with the employees' Section 7 right to choose a bargaining
representative.
If the recognition clause violates the duty to bargain in good faith
because it is tantamount to vote buying, why is this not also true of the
ballot clause? The key distinction between the two clauses is that the latter
aims to align incentives in a manner entirely consistent with the underlying
reasons for the institutional structure, while the former aligns incentives in
a manner inconsistent with such reasons. The ballot clause in Borg-Warner
aimed to align the decisions of union representatives with those of the
employees they represent. The recognition clause sought a reversal of a
Board-conducted election, and, of course, the theory supporting all Boardconducted elections is that they accurately reflect the preferences of the
employees at the time of voting.126
The framework I propose is as follows: There is a core of bargaining
matters that should be considered permissive in favor of the union. Within
that core is any attempt to persuade employees to bargain away or transfer
the most basic entitlement guaranteed by Section 7 of the NLRA: the right
to choose a bargaining representative. The extent to which a matter is
permissive depends on its tendency to interfere, in the sense considered
here, with that Section 7 right. Thus, the recognition clause of Borg-Warner
is permissive because it is, in essence, an attempt by the employer to
purchase the choice of bargaining agent. Similarly, a clause removing the
union as bargaining agent altogether should be deemed permissive.
Thus, the core of permissive category topics is very closely linked to
Section 7 of the Act. Critics of the Borg-Warner decision have failed to see
this. Cox,' 2 7 Wellington,128 and others' 29 have argued that the mandatorypermissive distinction should be abolished and the category of mandatory
topics expanded to include almost all bargaining matters. 130 But that
126. See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) ("In election proceedings, it is
the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted,
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the
employees.").
127. Cox, supra note 3, at 44.
128. WELLINGTON, supra note 3, at 63-90.
129. E.g., Note, Major OperationalDecisions and Free Collective Bargaining: Eliminatingthe
Mandatory/Permissive Distinction, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1971, 1989 (1989) (criticizing rigidity
imposed on negotiations by an artificial distinction between mandatory and permissive
topics).
130. Other critics have taken the position that the NLRB is ill-suited to determine
bargaining disputes regardless of the subject matter. See Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance:
Freedom of Contract and the Prospectsfor Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 377-79
(1985).
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would allow employers to introduce disguised versions of the yellow-dog
contract, an outcome that the critics of Borg-Warner surely would find even
more objectionable.
In contrast, the theory of core permissiveness implies that an employer
who insists on altering the size or the composition of the bargaining unit
violates the duty to bargain in good faith. 3 1 Similarly, an agreement to
forgo the distribution of union-provided information on company property
at any time should also be permissive. The reason is that the right 1 to
7 right. 32
distribute union literature has been held to be a basic Section
An attempt to purchase the right to distribute union information from the
employees potentially interferes with the right to choose because of the
"prisoner's dilemma" incentives generated by such a bargaining strategy.
The theory of core permissiveness provides a rationale for the Supreme
Court's decision in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. 13 3 In 1950 the union and Pittsburgh Plate Glass negotiated an
employee group health insurance plan in which retired employees could
participate by having the required premiums deducted from their pension
benefits. When Medicare was enacted, the employer unilaterally reduced
its contributions to the health plan for pensioners. The union alleged that
it had a right to bargain as the agent for the retirees and that the
employer's unilateral action therefore concerned a mandatory topic of
bargaining. The Court held that the changes in the retired employees'
pension benefits were not inconsistent with the duty to bargain in good
faith because the retirement benefits were not within the category of
mandatory topics. More generally, the Court suggested that matters of
concern to individuals outside of the bargaining unit would be deemed
only if they "vitally affect" the interests of employees within the
mandatory
13 4
unit.

The union in Pittsburgh Plate Glass was attempting to bargain on behalf
of individuals who were not in the bargaining unit. Although the union
offered the noblest of motives-protecting retired employees from expropriation by the employer-there is an alternative view. Effort on the part
of the union to expand the bargaining unit by claiming to act on behalf of

131. Actually, the theory goes a bit further to suggest that such matters should be

nonwaivable entitlements assigned to one of the parties. See generally Michael C. Harper,
Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part I, 4 INDUs. REL. L.J. 335 (1981).

Although Harper does not rely on the "prisoner's dilemma" theory proposed here, his basic
insight is similar. The arguments presented in this section are consistent with and could be
used to provide additional support for his theory of nonwaivable rights.
132. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974) (finding a ban against the employ-

ee's distribution of union literature violates Section 7 even if agreed to by the union and
employer); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945) (holding employer's

"no-distribution" rule regarding union literature violates Section 7).
133. 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1981).
134. Id. at 179.
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individuals outside of the unit benefits the union by expanding the pool of
assets over which it can exercise influence. Suppose the workforce is
composed of two sets of employees, production employees, who are unionized, and maintenance employees, who are not unionized. The wage bill
for production employees is five hundred dollars and the wage bill for
maintenance employees is four hundred dollars. If the union representing
production employees can persuade the employer to allow it to bargain on
behalf of maintenance employees, then the wage bill under its influence
expands from five hundred to nine hundred dollars. If the maintenance
employees have less influence over the union than the production employees, then the likely outcome is that the production employees will expropriate part of the wages earned by the maintenance employees. Anticipating
the danger, maintenance employees would race to form unions in order to
protect themselves from the appropriative efforts of other bargaining units
within the company. The employer, aware of the tension, would be most
likely to recognize and grant expansive bargaining rights to the weakest
13 5
unit.

At first glance, Pittsburgh Plate Glass is more complicated than my
example because it involves two generations of the same group of employees. However, the problems observed in the case of two bargaining units,
one claiming to represent the other, are present beneath the surface in the
Pittsburgh Plate Glass facts. If the employees were sufficiently forwardlooking and rational, there would be little reason not to allow the union to
bargain on behalf of retired employees. The union members would realize
that they will one day be retired employees themselves, and a norm of
protecting the interests of retirees would benefit the present employees in
the long run. Nevertheless, the current employees would always have an
incentive to expropriate the benefits of the retired generation.' 3 6 Realizing
that they may be expropriated by a future generation, they may choose to
move first rather than risk becoming victims later on.
My point is that expanded bargaining-that is, allowing the union to
bargain on behalf of individuals not in the bargaining unit-can have the
paradoxical effect of weakening Section 7 rights. In the context of Pittsburgh Plate Glass, where two generations of employees were involved,
allowing current employees to bargain on behalf of the retired opens the
possibility that the current employees will expropriate the wealth of the
retired. In addition, the risk of expropriation by the next generation would
enhance the incentive for the current employees to expropriate the benefits of the (then) retired generation. The resulting tension between the
135. The "weakest unit" refers to the workers who can be most easily replaced either by
new employees or by machines. Although they would control a larger share of the wage bill,
their threats to strike would not be troublesome to the employer if they could easily be
replaced.
136. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 173.
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different bargaining units would weaken the union as a bargaining agent."'
2. Permissive "in Favor of Management"
The doctrine governing subjects permissive in favor of management is
more developed than that governing subjects permissive in favor of the
union. The basic doctrine is that subjects dealing with the "core of entrepreneurial control" are permissive in favor of management, while those primarily concerning labor costs are mandatory.1 38 The classic example of a
subject that is at the core of entrepreneurial control is the exit decision.
The decision to close an entire business is permissive in favor of management.13 9 Similarly, the decision to enter an entirely new line of business is
permissive. The economic theory justifying these distinctions is well developed. My aim is to provide a contract theory basis for the distinctions
between mandatory and permissive subjects recognized in the law.
Opportunism, credibility of threats, and the endpoints of Section 8(a)(5).
Several economists, most notably Oliver Williamson, have emphasized that
many contractual relationships consist of a period in which the parties
invest in some transaction-specific asset that subsequently generates transaction-specific quasi-rents1 4 ° that are shared among the parties to the
contract.14 1 Firm-specific human capital is an example of such an asset. In
the case of firm-specific human capital, the transaction-specific asset is the
human capital itself-the set of skills, information, and methods that
enhance an employee's productivity within the firm without corresponding
enhancements outside of the firm. The transaction-specific quasi-rent from
the employees' perspective is measured by the extent to which the worker's
137. For a related argument, see Derek Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof
American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1426-27 (1970) (suggesting that parts of labor

law doctrine are designed to regulate intra-union conflict and employer divide-and-conquer
strategies).
138. First Nat'l Mainte'nance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676-77 (1981); see also Robert
A. Gorman, The Negligible Impact of the National LaborRelations Act on ManagerialDecisions

to Close or Relocate, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1354, 1355-56 (1984) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court has unjustifiably narrowed the NLRA, thereby "exalting managerial prerogatives at
the expense of legitimate employee interests in job security").
139. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273 (1965).
140. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian, Decision Sharingand Expropriable Quasi-Rents:A Theory

of First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, 1 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 235, 238-40
(1982). A pure economic rent is the revenue earned as the result of some natural advantage,
such as location near a heavily travelled waterway. A quasi-rent, on the other hand, is a

competitive advantage that has been created. For example, the extra revenue generated by
building a series of lines to supply power to a city is the quasi-rent generated by the power
lines.
141. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) [herein-

after

WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]; WILLIAMSON,

supra note 103, at 28; Benjamin

Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,
21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298-99 (1978); Oliver E. Williamson et al., Understandingthe Employment Relation: The Analysis of IdiosyncraticExchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 251 (1975).
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wage exceeds the wage that could be earned at other firms. The transactionspecific quasi-rent from the employer's perspective is measured by the
extent to which the wage falls short of the value of the employee's marginal product. The sum of these two portions of the rent equals the total
firm-specific rent generated by the investment in human capital. 142
The specificity of the rent generates a new problem: opportunistic
behavior.1 43 The employer can reduce the wage to the level of the employee's value outside the firm without fear of losing the employee, and in this
sense appropriate the employee's expected rent. The union is one governance structure that might arise in order to deter efforts on the employer's
part to appropriate rents earned by the employees. 1" On the other hand,
the employees may attempt to appropriate the portion of the rent earned
by the employer. Rent appropriation will occur through a number of
routes, but one prominent method involves issuing threats at the bargaining table. For example, the employer may threaten to contract-out bargaining unit work in order to get the employees to accept a lower wage.
The function of labor law in this area is to regulate these efforts by
controlling the nature and timing of threats that may be issued by either
side. What threats need to be regulated? It is clear that threats which are
not credible-in the sense that they are unlikely to be carried out-do not
need to be regulated. This intuition is evident from the doctrine in this
area. Consider Textile Workers Union of America v. DarlingtonManufacturing Co., 14 5 which held that the decision to exit a business is permissive in
favor of management. It is unlikely that an employer would carry out a
threat to exit simply to enhance its bargaining position in future negotiations.' 46 The Getman, Goldberg, and Herman study of union elections
found that threats issued during a union election campaign seemed not to
affect the outcome. 1 47 While the authors did not survey the voters to find
out why employer threats had so little influence, 1 48 a plausible explanation
is that the typical threat-to close down a business if the union won the

142. For an excellent discussion of the theory in the context of labor contracts, see

Wachter & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1355-67.

143.

WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS,

supra note 141, at 52-67.

144. Hylton & Hylton, supra note 70, at 833-36; Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining
Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and IndustrialPeace, 91
MICH.

L.

REV.

419, 491 (1992).

145. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).

146. For a more rigorous statement, see Hylton & Hylton, supra note 63, at 185-89.
147. JULIUS GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY
147-48 (1976).
148. Getman, Goldberg, and Herman offered several theories to explain the ineffectiveness of employer threats. Employees could believe that the secrecy of their voting prevents
the employer from carrying out selective reprisals. They might also expect protection against
company threats. Id. at 148. However, the survey did not ask the employees to explain the
failure of these threats. Id. at 44.
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149
election-is incredible and understood to be so by union organizers.
On the other hand, a threat to subcontract bargaining unit work if wage
reductions are not accepted is more likely to be credible. Here, however, a
15 °
distinction must be made between core and noncore work. It is unlikely
that an employer would carry ouit a threat to contract-out the core of the
business merely to exert downward pressure on wages, because this would
be equivalent to an exit decision.1 51 Hence, the decision to contract-out
work at the very core of the enterprise should be deemed permissive in
favor of management. With respect to noncore work, such as maintenance,
the threat to subcontract is significantly more credible and therefore may
be a suitable candidate for mandatory bargaining. The Board's decisions
are consistent with this reasoning. In FibreboardPaper Products Corp. v.
NLRB,' 5 2 the Court, agreeing with the Board, held that the employer's
decision to subcontract maintenance work violated its duty to bargain in
54
good faith. 53 However, in Garwood-DetroitTruck Equipment, Inc.1 and in
Fraser Shipyards, Inc., 5' 5 the Board held that the employer's decision to
scope of the enterprise that
subcontract was such a change in the scale and
1 56
bargaining.
it was not subject to mandatory
Thus, rent appropriation analysis suggests that the key concern from the
perspective of the employees is the credibility of an employer's threat.
Entry and exit decisions are at the core of permissiveness because they
generally do not provide the foundation for a credible threat to act
unilaterally. On the other extreme, a threat to replace employees with
similarly skilled, lower wage workers is more likely to be credible. Between
these two extremes, the task in litigation is to categorize the employer's
decision as either equivalent to an exit or entry decision, or one based
entirely on a desire to reduce wages. The doctrine governing bargaining
obligations in subcontracting, relocation, and partial closure cases sup-

149. Hylton & Hylton, supra note 63, at 186.

150. Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 471, 517-18 (1993)

(distinguishing between work tangential to the essential form of the enterprise and work
integral to the essential form of the enterprise).
151. Id.

152. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
153. Id. at 209.
154. 274 N.L.R.B. 113, 114-15 (1985) (holding that employer's decision to subcontract

service work from a garage was not subject to mandatory bargaining).
155. 272 N.L.R.B. 496, 497 (1984) (holding that employer was not obligated to bargain
about its decision to subcontract machine shop work rather than modernize its existing
facilities).
156. For other cases involving subcontracting decisions that make the same point, see
Kroger Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 462, 462-63 (1984) (holding that grocer's decision to subcontract
out its egg processing operation involved a change in the nature and direction of the business
and thus was not a subject of mandatory bargaining); Kingwood Mining Co., 210 N.L.R.B.
844 (1974) (holding that employer's decision to shut down its coal operations, sell its
equipment, and subcontract the work was a basic management decision and not a mandatory
subject of bargaining).
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ports this characterization. 15 7 In Otis Elevator Co. the Labor Board concluded that "the critical factor to a determination whether the decision is
subject to mandatory bargaining is the essence of the decision itself, i.e.,
whether it turns upon a change in the nature or direction of the business,
or turns upon labor costs ... ."' The basic distinction between "scope
and direction, 159 and "labor costs" cases remains the key test applied in
this area.16 °
The horizon problem: implications for the scope of mandatory bargaining.
An alternative view of permissiveness is based on productive efficiency
concerns. Employees have little incentive to be concerned about the value
of the firm beyond their own tenure."' The shareholders, on the other
hand, reap the benefits today of investments that increase the value of the
firm fifty years hence. Thus, the efficiency costs of mandated bargaining
are likely to be greatest in the area of long-term investment decisions, a
category that includes entry and exit decisions. Workers, for example,
generally would not vote in favor of shutting down a business as long as the
assets can generate wage payments. Because their relevant horizons are
shorter than those of the shareholders, they would also be willing to
sacrifice investments with long-term payoffs in exchange for current wage
increases.
It may be helpful to distinguish between two types of investment decisions: short term "substitution" decisions and long term "scale or scope"
decisions. Substitution decisions concern the mix of capital and labor that
will be used in producing a given quantity of output. Once the prices of
capital and labor are fixed, the firm adjusts its mix of the two inputs in
order to minimize costs.162 When the union has market power, it can use
the bargaining process to affect the price of labor relative to capital. Scale
157. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981) (requiring
employer to bargain over partial closure decision only if the benefit to the collective

bargaining process outweighs the burden on the business); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Co. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964); Hylton & Hylton, supra note 63, at 517. For an alternative

theory that generates similar conclusions, see Wachter & Cohen, supra note 3. But see Jeffery
D. Hedlund, Note, An Economic Case for Mandatory Bargaining over Partial Termination and
Plant Relocation Decisions, 95 YALE L.J. 949, 962-68 (1986) (arguing that bargaining over

partial closure decisions should be required in all cases).
158. 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 892 (1984), rev'g 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981).
159. FirstNational Maintenance,452 U.S. at 677.

160. See, e.g., Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386, 391 (1991) (announcing a new test
for partial relocation decisions that examines whether the business's basic operation will be
changed, and if not, whether the labor costs were a factor in the decision or whether
extraneous costs would have prevented the union from offering sufficient concessions to alter
the employer's decision).
161. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An
Application to Labor-ManagedFirms and Codetermination,52 J. Bus. 469, 482 (1979).
162. See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 322-23 (4th ed.

1988).
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or scope decisions concern the scale at which the firm operates-the size
of the plant, the level of output, and the range and nature of products
produced.
The divergence between the interests of workers and owners that results
from their different horizons is most pronounced in the area of long-term
scale or scope decisions. The interest divergence is analogous to that
between creditors and shareholders. Workers whose wages are fixed by
contract are a species of fixed claimant, while shareholders are residual
claimants. Like all fixed claimants, workers will tend to prefer safe investments that maximize the probability of receiving the contractually specified wage. They will prefer to delay shut down and asset transfer decisions
that threaten their jobs. When failure of the firm seems likely, the workers,
like other fixed claimants, will have an incentive to pursue an end-game
an empty,
strategy of taking as much out of the firm as possible, leaving
claimants. 163
other
and
shareholders
for
shell
asset-depleted
The interest divergence problem is not so great in the short term
because decisions that increase the value of the firm in the short run
generate rents, which can be shared by the parties. For example, once the
wage is fixed, achievement of the profit-maximizing level of output increases the size of the pie that can be split between workers and owners.
Furthermore, substitution decisions can be adjusted to respond to market
conditions, while scale and scope decisions are often difficult to reverse.
Synthesis. Mandated bargaining over long-term investment decisions is
likely to reduce productive efficiency by delaying, and in some cases
preventing, the transfer of assets into more productive uses. Of course, all
mandated bargaining poses the risk of interfering with productive efficiency; the risk is simply higher in the area of long-term investment
decisions. Productive efficiency and credibility thus provide two dimensions of concern that may be used to provide a theory of permissiveness in
bargaining. Figure 3 illustrates the argument.
Core permissiveness indicates the area in which threats are not credible
and productive efficiency is significantly hurt by mandated bargaining
(Area IV, Figure 3). Entry and exit decisions fall in this area; for example,
the decision of the owner of a single plant to shut down. In Textile Workers
64
Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.,' the Supreme Court
held that the decision to shut down an entire business is a "management
the employer could exercise even if the motivation is to
prerogative" that
1 65
union.
a
crush
163. This incentive has been suggested by some commentators as a justification for
bankruptcy statutes. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND

MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 31-35 (1985) (discussing "common pool" problem).
164. 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965).

165. Id. at 273-74.
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The decision to close part of a business also falls in the area of core
permissive matters. However, the analysis is complicated here because of
the difficulty of distinguishing partial closure decisions from short-term
substitution decisions. Consider the decision by the owners of a gas station
to lay off attendants who pump gas and replace them with self-serve gas
pumps. One could characterize this as a short-term substitution decision,
replacing a few workers with machines that perform much of their work.
However, suppose the gas station attendants performed several other
duties (for example, washing cars, doing minor repairs, rendering advice
on car maintenance, providing directions to travelers). As the list of duties
grows, it becomes clear that the decision to terminate the attendants is not
just a substitution decision; it is closer to an exit from the business of
selling a set of services traditionally associated with gas stations.
In First NationalMaintenanceCorp. v. NLRB,16 6 the Supreme Court held
that partial closure decisions are permissive. The employer provided housekeeping, cleaning, and maintenance services for commercial customers in
New York City. The employer was losing money at one of its sites, the
Greenpark Care Center, and asked that its fee be restored to an earlier,
166. 452 U.S. 666, 685 (1981).
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higher figure. After Greenpark turned down the request, the employer
terminated its relationship with Greenpark without bargaining with the
union.
There is little ambiguity in First NationalMaintenance as to whether the
bargaining topic involved a scale or a substitution decision. A decision to
exit a portion of the market is a scale decision. Further, a threat to
terminate a desired customer if the union did not reduce wages would
generally not be credible.' 6 7 Hence, the employer's decision in First National Maintenance was properly grouped with the decision in Darlington in
the area of core permissive subjects.
The difficulty in characterizing a decision as either a substitution or
68
scale decision is probably best illustrated by Davis v. NLRB.' The employer ran a restaurant located in a Holiday Inn in Benton, Illinois. Faced
with declining sales resulting from competition with fast food operators,
the employer converted the facility into a self-service cafeteria. As a result,
the waitresses were laid off. The Board, in disagreement with the administrative law judge, held that the conversion decision was a subject of
mandatory bargaining, and, therefore, the employer's unilateral act of
conversion violated Section 8(a)(5).' 6 9
Davis is the real-life version of my gas station example. The decision to
replace waitresses with a self-serve cafeteria can be treated as a substitution of capital for labor-like the decision to replace gas station attendants
with self-serve pumps. But it can also be viewed as an exit decision. The
waitress performs a distribution service similar to that of a retailer. If the
duties of the waitress are sufficiently demanding-memorizing a long
menu, speaking in a foreign language or with an affected foreign accent,
dispensing advice on the size of portions or the preference of the average
diner-then the decision to replace them with a self-service counter and
plastic trays is equivalent to a decision to exit the market for the provision
of a valued service.
principle, 17
This analysis reveals why Michael Harper's product market
17
brilliantly applied to Davis, is incomplete. ' Harper characterizes the
employer's decision in Davis as a decision to alter the nature and target
market of the employer's product. 172 While Harper's principle takes us to
167. If the relationship with the customer was unprofitable, then the rent appropriation
concern seems far-fetched. The employer's termination reflects a determination that it
would be better to exit the relationship than to maintain it through cost reductions.
168. 617 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1980).
169. Davis, 237 N.L.R.B. 1042, 1042-43 (1978). The Seventh Circuit held that the evidence
supported the Board's finding of a Section 8(a)(5) violation. Davis, 617 F.2d at 1269.
170. See Harper, supra note 3, at 1447 (1982). The product market principle "would
exclude from compulsory bargaining all decisions to determine what products are created
and sold, in what quantities, for which markets, and at what prices." Id. at 1450.
171. Id. at 1466 (applying product market principle to Davis).
172. Id.
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the bottom of the problem, the question is whether the conversion in Davis
should be characterized as a "product market decision." That requires an
examination of the facts. If the waitresses were providing only the most
basic service-simply taking orders and shouting them to the cook-then
replacing them with a self-service counter could fairly be characterized as
a substitution of capital for labor. Although not all of the relevant facts are
laid out, the administrative law judge's decision suggests that the employer
made the conversion in Davis in order to compete more effectively against
fast food restaurants in the area.17 3 This suggests that Harper's characterization is correct after all and that the employer's decision did concern the
scale and scope of the enterprise.
In contrast, core mandatory subjects are those areas in which the threats
are credible, and mandated bargaining does not clearly hurt productive
efficiency (Area II, Figure 3). A subcontracting decision that involves
nothing more than replacing one set of workers with another would fall
into this area. The classic example is given by the facts of FibreboardPaper
Products Corp. v. NLRB.' 7 4 After undertaking a study of the potential cost
savings that could be achieved through subcontracting, the employer informed the union that it would be "pointless" to negotiate a new contract.17 5 The employer terminated the maintenance employees and
transferred the work of the bargaining unit to a subcontractor. The Court
held that the decision to subcontract was a mandatory subject of bargaining. The analysis here supports the Court's decision because the subcontracting in Fibreboardwas clearly a substitution decision. In addition, the
threat to contract out unit work is, generally, one that is likely to be
credible.
A more problematic area is made up of those subjects on which mandated bargaining is very likely to hurt productive efficiency and, at the
same time, could form the basis of a credible threat on the employer's part
(Area I, Figure 3). With respect to these matters, it is difficult to state a
general rule either requiring or not requiring bargaining. The appropriate
formula is that stated by the Court in FirstNationalMaintenance: "bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the
continued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process,
outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business."' 176 The
formula should be applied on a case-by-case basis. First National Maintenance can be analyzed as a case in this area-a useful exercise to the
extent that it suggests that the conclusions of this analysis are not greatly
affected by the category to which a case is assigned.
173. Davis, 237 N.L.R.B. at 1055.
174. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).

175. Id. at 206.
176. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981).
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Consider the following generalization of the facts of First National
Maintenance. Suppose a business that is part of a larger enterprise is
widely known to be failing, although its failure is not merely a result of
high labor costs. The firm has lost revenue because of a shift'in consumer
tastes. Given common knowledge of the failure, the threat to exit is
credible, but because it is a scale decision, principles of productive efficiency counsel against requiring bargaining. The employer should not be
required to bargain in this case even though the threat is credible. If the
business is failing and the employer has decided to exit, mandated bargain177 If the employing over the closure decision would accomplish nothing.
ees were willing to make concessions that would save the firm, they
presumably would do so without a bargaining requirement. If they were
unwilling to make concessions, then the bargaining requirement would
only delay the exit decision.
1 78
Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Mansfield Plant) is a harder case-one
that does not seem at first glance to be either core permissive or core
mandatory. The Board noted that "[s]ince the early 1940's contracting out
ha[d] been a continuing phase of [the employer's] method of operation.' ' 179 The employer's method was to compare the cost of having the
work done by a subcontractor to that of having it done by its own employees, and then, without consulting the union, to decide whether to contract
out the work. The Board held that the employer did not violate Section
8(a)(5). It was important to the Board that the recurrent subcontracting
was motivated solely by economic considerations; that it comported with
the traditional methods by which the Respondent conducted its business
operations; that it did not during the period here in question vary
significantly in kind or degree from what had been customary under past
established practice; that it had no demonstrable adverse impact on
employees in the unit; and that the Union had the opportunity to bargain
about changes in existing subcontracting practices at general negotiating
meetings ....180

Although Westinghouse is superficially quite similar to Fibreboard, the
difference is that the continuous subcontracting observed in Westinghouse
was part of a plan of operation determined by the employer's scale and
177. See NLRB v. Royal Plating and Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965)
("[An employer faced with the economic necessity of either moving or consolidating the
operations of a failing business has no duty to bargain with the union respecting its decision
to shut down.").
178. 150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965).
179. Id. at 1574. In the period covered by the Section 8(a)(5) proceeding, the company
had awarded over 7,000 subcontracts involving work its own employees could have performed. BERNARD D. MELTZER & STANLEY D. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW 870 (1987).
180. Westinghouse, 150 N.L.R.B. at 1577.
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scope decisions. Thus, productive efficiency concerns suggest that bargaining should not have been required. On the other hand, each decision to
contract out work could have formed the basis of a credible threat, which
suggests that bargaining should have been required. How should the tie be
broken?
One approach is to note that while each subcontracting decision could
have laid the foundation for a credible threat to act unilaterally, the
subcontracting plan itself could not have formed the basis of such a threat,
because it would have required a massive alteration of the firm's scale of
production. The credibility analysis suggests the existence of a Section
8(a)(5) violation only if the analysis is misapplied by focusing on each
individual transaction, when the essence of the charge in Westinghouse was
that the employer's established practice constituted a violation of the duty
to bargain.
Another approach to breaking the tie draws on the court's observation
that no employees were clearly hurt by the employer's practice. A simple
balancing of the equities, as the First National Maintenance formula requires, suggests that bargaining should not have been required. The equity
balancing test of First National Maintenance is disconcertingly vague, but,
as much of this discussion suggests, cases in which it must be applied in
order to reach a conclusion should be rare. Subjects that serve well as the
basis of a credible threat are not likely to involve long-term investment
decisions, and the converse also holds.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This paper presents an economic theory of bargaining obligations under
the NLRA. Three aspects of the duty to bargain receive special attention:
the distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining topics, the
specific obligations that attach to bargaining on mandatory subjects, and
the specific obligations that attach to bargaining on permissive subjects.
The core of this paper sets out an economic framework for evaluating the
incentives created by the duty to bargain.
Section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) impose on the parties a duty to bargain in
good faith with respect to mandatory topics. This duty alters bargaining
incentives by enhancing the incentive to deal honestly and creating labels
that enhance the credibility of nonlegal sanctions. However, an employer
can be relieved of the duty with respect to a particular mandatory topic by
reaching an agreement with the union in which the union waives its right
to bargain on the topic. The power to opt out of the mandatory bargaining
regime raises the possibility that Section 8(a)(5) is nothing more than an
empty shell. The analysis in this paper suggests that it is not.
The duty to bargain in good faith alters incentives primarily by imposing
a duty to provide information relevant to bargaining and by shifting particular entitlements. Consider, for example, the employer's decision to subcon-
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tract. In a regime in which the employer enjoys absolute freedom with
respect to the subcontracting decision, the union would have to offer
concessions in order to get the employer to agree not to exercise her right
to subcontract for a specified period. However, given the informational
disparity-the employer knows more about the likelihood that an opportunity to subcontract work might appear than the employees do-the employees will frequently have an inadequate incentive to offer deep concessions.
A deal that the employer found easy to accept would probably be one in
which the union offered more than was necessary in the way of concessions, but the informational disparity would cause employees to be reluctant to offer concessions.
Under the duty to bargain regime, the "entitlement to subcontract" is
partially shifted because the employer must offer concessions in order to
be relieved of bargaining obligations that arise once the employer seriously
approaches the decision to subcontract. The bargaining obligations include
a requirement to provide information to the union. The entitlement shift
enhances the employer's incentive to provide information because the
gains from entering into a contract that relieves the employer of its
bargaining duty are likely to outweigh the benefits from either withholding
information or lying. The informational disparity is mitigated by the sanction associated with failure to disclose information and by the partial
entitlement shift.
Thus, the duty to bargain in good faith is more than just a legal
mechanism for discouraging opportunistic behavior or forcing the provision of private information. That function is performed almost entirely by
the duty to provide information. The law also includes a complicated series
of partial entitlement shifts that provide economic incentives not to act
opportunistically. The entitlement shifts make truth-telling behavior consistent with economic incentives.
This paper also provides a framework that makes sense of the distinction between permissive and mandatory bargaining topics and, in particular, the scope of mandatory bargaining. Because a party cannot insist on a
permissive topic to the point of impasse, the permissive label shelters some
topics from the bargaining process. The sheltering function has struck
most commentators as an unjustifiable and unnecessary intrusion. The
analysis of this paper demonstrates that the sheltering function serves
some defensible purposes. With respect to some of the permissive topics,
the sheltering function prevents the employer from introducing disguised
versions of the yellow-dog contract. Others, notably the doctrine of Pittsburgh Plate Glass, which concerns the union's ability to bargain on behalf
of older generations of workers, may prevent the myopically rational
behavior of employee representatives from destroying the union's effectiveness as a bargaining agent.
The scope of the employer's obligations can be explained by reference
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to two aspects of the economic relationship: the credibility of threats to act
unilaterally and the productive efficiency effects of compulsory bargaining.
These concerns explain much of the doctrine governing the relocation,
shut down, and partial termination cases.
APPENDIX

This section presents a formal discussion of the honest dealing problem
in the labor bargaining context (see Part III.A.2 of the text for a detailed
description of the model and assumptions). Assume that bargaining between the employer and the employee representative occurs over two
periods. In the first, the employer issues a report and proposes an agreement. In the second, the employee representative either accepts or rejects
the employer's report. Let S = the total surplus from agreement based on
an honest report by the employer. Let k = the percentage of surplus
received by the employer and 1 - k = the percentage of surplus received
by the employees. Let T = the transfer based on dishonest reporting by
employer. Let P = the penalty on employer for dishonest reporting. Let b
be the probability that the employee rejects the employer's report and a be
the probability that the employer reports honestly. Figure A.1 illustrates
the sequence of actions and accompanying payoffs.
A. HONESTY AND CONTRACT BARGAINING
PROPOSITION 1: IF THE PENALTY FOR LYING IS POSITIVE (P > 0), THEN
THE EQUILIBRIA OF CONTRACT BARGAINING ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) T < kS, 0 < P. The employer always tells the truth, and the employee always accepts the employer's offer.
(2) T > kS, 0 < P < T, kS + P < T. Some fraction of employers lie,
and some fraction of employees reject the employer's offer.
(3)

LT

(4)

f

> kS, 0 < P < T, kS + P > T. The employer always tells the
truth, and the employee always accepts the employer's offer.
> kS, P > T. The employer always tells the truth, and the employee always accepts the employer's offer.

Proposition 2: Given T > kS, 0 < P < T, kS + P < T:
(1) The probability that an employee rejects an offer by the employer
falls as the penalty on the employer increases.
(2) As k, the percentage of the surplus going to the employer increases,
the probability that the employer reports honestly increases, and the
probability that the employee rejects falls. The converse holds as
well.
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(kS, (1-k)S)

(0,0)
(-T, T-P)

(O,-P)
FIGURE A. 1

The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. In the first case, where
T < kS, the reward from an honest deal outweighs the benefits to the
employer from reporting falsely. The employer always reports honestly,
and employees, aware of this, always accept. In the second case, T > kS
and P < T, the reward from reporting falsely exceeds that from reporting
honestly. The penalty discourages some dishonest reporting, but is not
large enough to eliminate the practice altogether. However, not all employers report falsely (the probability of a false report is not one) because they
wish their reports to retain some credibility. In the third case, all dishonest
reporting is discouraged because the sum of the penalty and the gain from
honest reporting exceeds the gains from dishonest reporting. In the fourth
case, even though the gain from dishonesty is greater than that from
honest dealing, the penalty is so high that the employer prefers honesty.
For the second proposition, note that an increase in the penalty reduces
the payoff to the employer from reporting falsely. Thus, the probability of
a false report declines and, as a consequence, the probability of an accep-
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tance by the employee rises. If the employer gains more from the deal (i.e.,
k increases), then the benefits from reporting honestly increase relative to
the gains from exploiting his informational advantage.
Proof of Proposition 1: Start with the first statement. The payoff to the
employer from reporting falsely is (1 - b)T - P. The payoff to the employer from reporting honestly is (1 - b)kS. Thus, the payoff from honesty
exceeds that from dishonesty if and only if 0 > (1 - b)(T - kS) - P.
Thus, T < kS implies honesty on the employer's part, so that a*=l. The
payoff to the employee from accepting the employer's offer is a((1 - k)S
+T) - T. The payoff to the employee from rejecting is 0. Thus, when
a*= 1, the employee will always accept.
Now consider the second statement of Proposition 1. From the foregoing, it is easy to show that the employer is indifferent between reporting
honestly and falsely when 0 = (1 - b)(T - kS) - P. This condition requires kS + P < T. Provided that this holds,
b* = (T - P - kS)/(T - kS).
The employee is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the employer's offer when
a* = T/[(1 - k)S + T].
If kS + P > T, then truth-telling is a dominant strategy for the employer.
It follows that a* = 1, b* = 0.
Finally, consider the third statement of Proposition 1. Recall that the
employer's payoff from reporting falsely is (1 - b)T - P. It follows that
P > T is sufficient to induce honesty on the employer's part, and that
implies a* = 1, b* = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: Both statements follow from taking derivatives of
the equilibrium solutions for a* and b*.
Proposition 3: If the penalty for lying is zero (P = 0), then the equilibria of
contractbargainingare asfollows:
(1) T > kS. The employee always rejects the employer's offer, and some
fraction of employers a', where a' is in the interval [0,
T/[(1 - k)S + T]), tell the truth.
(2) T < kS. (a) The employer always tells the truth, and the employee
always accepts the employer's offer. (b) The employee always rejects
the employer's offer, and some fraction of employers, a', where a' is
in the interval [0, T/[(1 - k)S + TI), tell the truth.

1994]

DUTY

TO BARGAIN

The intuition is as follows: When the penalty for dishonesty is zero and
the reward from dishonesty exceeds that from honesty, the employees
know that if they accept with positive probability, lying will be a dominant
strategy for the employer. Thus there can be no equilibrium in which
employees accept with positive probability. When the reward from honesty
exceeds that for dishonesty, for any rejection probability less than one,
truth-telling is a dominant strategy for the employer. However, if rejection
occurs with certainty, the equilibrium may be one in which lying is observed. The employer has no incentive to tell the truth because employees
will not accept the employer's proposal anyway.
Proof of Proposition 3: (1) T > kS case: Suppose b < 1. Then given P = 0
and T > kS, (1 - b)kS < (1 - b)T, so the employer's incentive is to lie,
which implies b* = 1. However, the employer is indifferent when b = 1.
Let the fraction of employers reporting the truth be a'. If a' < T/[(1 - k)S
+ T], then the employee's incentive will be to reject the employer's offer.
If a' exceeds this threshold, the employees will accept, which implies b* =
0. But if b* = 0, then the employer's incentive is to lie. Now suppose b = 1.
The preceding argument repeats itself.
(2) T < kS case: Suppose 0 < b < 1. Then the employer's incentive is
to tell the truth, which implies a* = 1, b* = 0. Suppose b = 1. Then if a' of
the employers report the truth, where a' is in the interval stated above, the
employees will reject with probability one.
Proposition 4: Suppose some fraction of employers, a", always tell the truth.
If a" > T/[(1 - k)S + T], then we have the following equilibria:
(1) T > kS. The fraction of employers who tell the truth is a", and
employees always accept the employer's offer.
(2) T < kS. The employer always tells the truth and the employee
always accepts the employer's offer.
If the fraction of employers who tell the truth because of ethical constraints is sufficiently high, employees will accept the employer's offer,
even though the probability of a lie is positive. All proposals are accepted,
so in this sense there is no bargaining failure. However, some employers
gain an advantage by expropriating wealth from employees.
Proof of Proposition 4: (1) T > kS case. Suppose b < 1. Then given P = 0
and T > kS, the employer's incentive is to lie. Thus, the probability that
the employer lies is 1 - a", given that a" of the employers will not lie under
any circumstances. Because a" of employers tell the truth, where a" >
T/[(1 - k)S + T], it follows that a"[(1 - k)S + T] - T > 0. This implies
that the employee will accept the employer's offer, so that b* = 0, a* = a"
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FIGURE A.2

in equilibrium. Suppose b = 1. Then the employer is indifferent. Because
at least a" of employers tell the truth, the employee will accept the
employer's offer, which implies b* = 0. But then the employer is no longer
indifferent, so a* = a".
(2) T < kS case. Suppose 0 < b < 1. Given P = 0 and T < kS, the
employer's incentive is to tell the truth, so a* = 1, b* = 0. Suppose b = 1.
Then the employer is indifferent. However, since a* will not fall below a",
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the employee will always have an incentive to accept, implying b* = 0,
a*
B. THE IMPACT OF SECTION

8(A)(5)

Suppose the employer's report concerns some future event, such as the
possibility of subcontracting bargaining unit work to another firm. A lowcost subcontractor may or may not become available. Let q be the probability that the low-cost subcontractor becomes available. The bargaining
process can then be illustrated as follows.
Because of Section 8(a)(5), the employees have the option of bargaining
when the low-cost subcontractor becomes available. If the probability that
the employer is lying about the probability of a low-cost subcontractor
appearing is positive, the employee's incentive will be to reject the employer's proposal.
The parties may choose to bargain if the employee is risk averse, or if
they choose to bargain over the scope of a zipper clause. The employer's
informational advantage gives rise to the problems noted in the previous
section. Section 8(a)(5) reduces the probability of dishonesty through
several routes. First, the information disclosure duty introduces an additional penalty that may be incurred by reporting falsely. Second, the value
of the employer's entitlement to subcontract is dependent upon the probability of rejection by the employee. Let VH be the value of the entitlement
to subcontract in the absence of a duty to bargain. Let VL be the value of
the entitlement if employees reject with probability one. It is reasonable to
assume VH > VL. The value of the right to subcontract under Section
8(a)(5) is
V(b) = VH(1 - b) + VLb
The preceding section demonstrates that if the employer adopts a policy
of truth-telling, b = 0. Thus, the payoff to the employer from lying, under
Section 8(a)(5), is (1 - b)T - P - [V(0) - V(b)]. Because this is unambiguously less than (1 - b)T - P, the employer's incentive to lie is lessened.
Yet another route through which Section 8(a)(5) affects bargaining
incentives is through the creation of labels. A finding that the employer
violated the duty to bargain creates a label that probably enhances the
likelihood of incurring P in future rounds.

